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I. INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance may be the poster-boy of international development, but 
the facts remain that 100 million borrowers are in poverty and most 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are not financially self-sustainable.1 This 
means that there are systemic faults, which do not allow the goals of 
microfinance to be consistently achieved. This paper considers the 
interaction between regulation and the goals of microfinance being 
achieved, with specific focus on financially self-sustainable MFIs. Previous 
research has not considered microfinance from a law and economics 
perspective. Regulation has the potential to directly affect the financial 
sustainability of MFIs,2 through restricting or supporting their business 
operations regarding obtaining capital and product design.3 Given that 
financially self-sustainable MFIs have the potential to increase long-term 
access to financial services without reliance on donations,4 the influence of 
regulation in this sector is a critical area for study. Despite the importance 
of the topic, little research has discussed the way regulation creates 
incentives for MFIs and borrowers, affecting financial self-sustainability.5 
Thus, a law and economics perspective, which considers just this, is an 
important perspective from which to consider how microfinance can 
achieve its long-term goals. This article is the first which considers such an 
important yet overlooked issue. In order to consider the law and economics 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 Financial self-sustainability refers to the ability of MFIs to operate on an on-going basis and to 
expand through financing and operations on market based rates. This means that MFIs which rely on 
NGO or subsidised lending in order to operate or expand are not financially self-sustainable. See 
Mostafa M. Hasan et al., Local Government Investment Outreach and Sustainability of Microfinance 
Institutions: A Case Study of B, Bangladesh, 34 J. SOC., POL. & ECON. STUD. 348 (2009). 
2 See, e.g., United Nations, The World Bank, Measuring Financial Inclusion: The Global Findex 
Database, Policy Research Working Paper 6025, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Leora Klapper (Apr. 2012), 
available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6042. 
3 Lucy Hurst et al., Global Microscope on the Microfinance Business Environment, Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2013), available at www.eiu.com/microscope2013. 
4 Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink, The Empirics of Microfinance: What Do We Know?, 117 THE 
ECON. J. F1, F8–F9 (2007) (authors find that the financial self-sustainability of MFIs is linked to long 
term benefits to the poor). 
5 Most published research in the field of microfinance is anecdotal in nature and takes the 
perspective of “bottom-up” being the effect of microfinance on the poor, rather than a strategic 
perspective of how regulation affects MFIs. 
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of microfinance this article will present a comparison between financial 
relationship in developed and developing contexts and explore how 
microfinance completes a credit market failure that has resulted in those 
who are willing and able to obtain financial services being excluded from 
the market. 
Despite microfinance being a popular topic for academic discussion, 
little of the previous research has been conducted in an empirically sound 
manner, and even fewer considering the financial management of MFIs.6 
This paper presents a discussion previously untouched in the literature by 
focusing on the available literature, which is empirical in nature. Some of 
the reasons for the general lack of empirical research in this field are 
inherent to the sample and instruments.7 Hermes and Lensink discuss the 
methodological weaknesses of most microfinance papers in this field as 
being that the variables to measure behaviour are only theoretically and 
indirectly related; that crude one-dimensional measures are used to proxy 
for complex constructs; and the endogeneity of the sample.8 Hermes and 
Lensink consider the effect of these methodological weaknesses and the 
importance of financial sustainability of MFIs. In particular, these authors 
find that if MFIs are unable to stand on their own “financial” feet, long-
term large-scale outreach to the poor cannot be guaranteed.9 Further, at a 
short-term level, these authors discuss how microfinance sustainability 
affects the breadth10 and depth11 of the clients served. 
Previous research on microfinance has covered a variety of literature 
that theoretically, anecdotally, or qualitatively considered the effect of 
microfinance on increasing the socioeconomic well being of the poor,12 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 Some exceptions to this are some papers published by The World Bank, and others that will be 
presented in the current paper. 
7 Hermes & Lensink, supra note 4, at F3. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at F8–F9. 
10 This refers to the numbers of borrowers reached. 
11 This refers to the socioeconomic situation of borrowers reached. In the context of microfinance, 
it is important that the “poor” are reached, as they are ordinarily excluded from the formal financial 
system, and microfinance is an initiative designed to address this financial exclusion in developing 
countries. 
12 Moh’d Al-Azzam et al., The Impact of Socioeconomic Factors and Financial Access on 
Microfinance Institutions, 4 INT’L J. ECON. & FIN. 61, 67 (2012). 
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which is inherently a bottom-up perspective.13 Previous research has found 
that while the social goals of microfinance, in particular female 
empowerment, have been consistently reached,14 reductions in poverty have 
not been found relative to the economic goals of microfinance.15 
Microfinance has confirmed social benefits and potential economic 
benefits through providing access to credit for the poor.16 Although the 
economic benefits of microfinance have not been empirically studied in an 
exhaustive number of studies, there is enough evidence to suggest that 
microfinance does not have a negative effect on economic development,17 
does not cost society or the government excessive amounts of fund to 
support it,18 and thus, it may be an appropriate system for increasing credit 
availability of the poor.19 In light of this, the current paper seeks to 
understand what institutional conditions can promote microfinance. In order 
to do this, the current article presents theoretical analysis from the law and 
economics perspective and presents the findings of the few empirical 
articles on microfinance. These discussions will be framed by consideration 
of the goals20 of microfinance considering the normal banking relationship. 
In analysing the development of microfinance law, it is intuitive to 
begin at a consideration of regular financial relationships; why the poor are 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 Considering microfinance in terms of the effect of loans on the borrowers mental health, 
socioeconomic standing and well-being is “bottom-up.” This is in comparison to a “top-down” 
perspective, which considers strategic issues such as regulation and business operations. 
14 Philip Megicks et al., Enhancing Microfinance Outreach through Market-Oriented New 
Service Development in Indian Regional Rural Banks, 23 INT’L J. BANK MARKETING 107 (2005). 
15 For a summary of the research supporting and challenging the benefits of microfinance see 
Katherine Hunt, Microfinance: Dreams and Reality, 2 INT’L REV. ON TRANSITIONS IN CORP. LIFE, L. & 
GOVERNANCE 62, 77 (2013). 
16 Christian Ahlin & Neville Jiang, Can Micro-Credit Bring Development?, 86 J. DEV. ECON. 1, 2 
(2008); see also Gail Arch, Microfinance and Development: Risk and Return from a Policy Outcome 
Perspective, 6 J. BANKING REG. 227, 241 (2005). 
17 See, e.g., Francisco J. Buera et al., The Macroeconomics of Microfinance, Working Paper No. 
17905, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17905. 
These authors illustrate that when using General Equilibrium and Partial Equilibrium there are economic 
benefits of microfinance. 
18 For governments to support microfinance it needs only regulatory support, rather than 
investment of funds. Hence, relative to other humanitarian initiatives, microfinance is not costly to 
support. 
19 For work on credit access, see, e.g., Daniel Agyapong et al., Criteria for Assessing Small and 
Medium Enterprises’ Borrowers in Ghana, 4 INT’L BUS. RES. 132 (2011). 
20 Rafiqur Rahman & Qiang Nie, The Synthesis of Grameen Bank Microfinance Approaches in 
Bangladesh, 3 INT’L J. ECON. & FIN. 207 (2011). 
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excluded from traditional financial relationships,21 and why regulatory 
support may be needed to promote microfinance.22 It has been established 
that microfinance is a method to increase financial inclusion.23 However, 
the poor have always had access to credit via family, friends,24 and “loan 
sharks.”25 These credit sources are not efficient: during economic or 
weather disasters, the regular sources of credit may no longer become 
available because the family or friends need the capital for their own 
survival.26 Thus, microfinance provides an avenue for a source of credit that 
is potentially more reliable. This is even more likely if MFIs are able to 
operate in a financially self-sustainable manner.27 
This article presents a theoretical analysis regarding the law and 
economics of microfinance. The theoretical perspectives presented in the 
current article inherently scratch only the surface of the potential analyses 
on the financial and structural detail of microfinance and general financial 
relationships. The problem-oriented discussions presented in this article 
provide a framework for discussing microfinance relationships with the 
goal of providing a foundation from which future discussion and research 
can build. As the first article on the topic of the law and economics of 
microfinance, this is required. 
Part II of this article considers normal banking relationships in a 
problem-oriented way, designed to provide background information from 
which subsequent discussions can build. This means that the current article 
will discuss the banking literature as far as it is relevant for microfinance 
and thus will remain at the surface of understanding and analysis regarding 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Mohammad Shafi & Ali Hawi Medabesh, Financial Inclusion in Developing Countries: 
Evidences from an Indian State, 5 INT’L BUS. RES. 116 (2012). 
22 See, e.g., M. Wakilur Rahman & Jianchao Luo, The Development Perspective of Finance and 
Microfinance Sector in China: How Far Is Microfinance Regulations?, 3 INT’L J. ECON. & FIN. 160 
(2011). 
23 Shafi & Medabesh, supra note 21. 
24 The method, though, was expensive and unreliable. Robert Mayer, Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate 
Caps, and Deregulation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807, 820 (2012). 
25 Id. Loan sharks make credit available to those in need with flexible loan and repayment terms. 
They do not always take collateral, however, as they are outside the financial system. Non-repayment 
often results in violence, slavery, or worse. Loan sharks are part of the TML system, which is a blanket 
term including also family and friends as traditional sources of capital. 
26 Id. 
27 Peter Crabb, Economic Freedom and the Success of Microfinance Institutions, 13 J. DEV. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 205, 217 (2008). 
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certain issues. Part III discusses access to finance being restricted from the 
poor. Part IV outlines the effectiveness and distributional goals of 
microfinance. Part V discusses facilitative regulation and CSR as potential 
initiatives. Part VI discusses direct regulation as a potential initiative to 
support microfinance; and the conclusion compares and contrasts Parts V 
and VI to determine the process of regulation most suited to promoting 
microfinance. 
II. TRADITIONAL FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
A. What Does a Normal Banking Relationship Look Like? 
Financial relationships are an aspect of normal life that many in the 
developed world may take for granted, because in developing countries 
what is considered a normal financial relationship exists only for the middle 
and upper classes.28 As a result of this heterogeneity in who has access to 
financial services, much of the ideas of “normal financial relationships” 
comes from developed countries.29 
Regardless of the location of the financial institutions or the 
characteristics of the client base, aspects of the financial relationship remain 
consistent.30 This is because people all over the world require financial 
institutions for consistent reasons and products are tailored to provide for 
these. In particular, people go to financial institutions to manage their risk,31 
build wealth,32 manage cash flow,33 and transfer money.34 These financial 
                                                                                                                           
 
28 Shafi & Medabesh, supra note 21. 
29 A plethora of papers consider financial relationships in developed countries ranging from 
innovations in financial services to financial planning. 
30 Financial products have a consistency across companies as required by law in such regulations 
as: ASIC, Disclosure: Product Disclosure Statements. 
31 Examples of this include insurance, fixed rate loans, and deposits. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & 
Douglas Gale, Innovations in Financial Services, Relationships, and Risk Sharing, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1239 
(1999); John Y. Campbell & João F. Cocco, Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage 
Choice, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1449 (2003). 
32 Examples of this include interest bearing savings accounts, investment portfolios and home 
mortgages. See, e.g., Asif Dowla & Alamgir Dewan, From Microcredit to Microfinance: Evolution of 
Savings Products by MFIs in Bangladesh, 15 J. INT’L DEV. 969 (2003). 
33 An example of this is a personal loans. See, e.g., Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, 
Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance, 64 J. FIN. 2807 (2009). 
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services are demand driven and products are designed within regulatory 
environments to suit the needs of customers. Thus, customers choose to 
have financial relationships because they have specific needs that financial 
institutions can meet. Normal financial relationships have consistent 
motivations and designs across the world.35 
The current research is primarily concerned with microfinance as a 
source of credit for the poor and other financial services tailored to the 
needs of the poor such as microsavings, microinsurance, and microbanking, 
like money transfer via mobile phones.36 
Traditional financial relationships include information asymmetry for 
both parties where the cost of information and search provides customers 
and banks with avenues to benefit from the relationship.37 Information 
asymmetry is a generic problem in banking relationships and banking law is 
often designed to attempt to reduce these asymmetries because of the 
resulting market failure.38 In traditional banking relationships, information 
asymmetry is reduced through signalling and monitoring.39 That is, 
borrowers signal to the bank that they are worthy of loans through 
providing financial reports, business plans, and offering collateral.40 The 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 For example, money transfers to sellers or to family overseas. See Shahid Nawaz et al., 
Informal and Formal Money Transfer Networks: Financial Service or Financial Crime?, 5 J. MONEY 
LAUNDERING CONTROL 330 (2002). 
35 Allen & Gale, supra note 31. 
36 In terms of a general definition of microfinance, a useful paper is United Nations, The World 
Bank Thematic Group on Poverty Analysis, Monitoring and Impact Evaluation, Impact Evaluation for 
Microfinance: Review of Methodological Issues, Doing Impact Evaluation No. 7, Dean Karlan & Nate 
Goldberg (Nov. 2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTISPMA/Resources/383704-11467522 
40884/Doing_ie_series_07.pdf. 
37 For a basic discussion of information asymmetry in general, see, e.g., George J. Stigler, The 
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
38 For a discussion of how asymmetric information can lead to banks building a monopoly 
because of the fact that they decrease their information asymmetries as the lending relationship 
progresses, see, e.g., Steven A. Sharpe, Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: 
A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships, 45 J. FIN. 1069 (1990) (monopolies in otherwise free 
markets are generally considered market failures). 
39 The mortgage literature generally considers that the fact-gathering procedures before loans are 
granted are designed to reduce information asymmetry on behalf of the bank. Further, the information 
gathered through the repayment behaviours of borrowers via on-going monitoring further serves to 
decrease asymmetric information to an even greater extent, as discussed in footnote 37. 
40 For a discussion on collateral, see Arito Ono & Iichiro Uesugi, Role of Collateral and Personal 
Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan’s SME Loan Market, 41 J. MONEY, CREDIT 
& BANKING 935, 940 (2009). 
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bank then monitors the borrower.41 In terms of banking relationships for the 
poor, the problems of information asymmetry are magnified because the 
poor are without methods to signal loan worthiness: they are unlikely to 
have collateral or financial statements.42 Small loan sizes mean banks are 
faced with high proportional monitoring costs per loan,43 so they expect a 
signal of quality but the poor do not have collateral44 to give. The result of 
this is the poor are left without access to capital.45 Hence, MFIs have been 
created which are designed based on a model where the poor are able to 
provide intangible collateral.46 This is a key innovation of microfinance 
from an economics perspective—the ability to substitute tangible with 
intangible collateral.47 
In the microfinance sector, the demographics of borrowers make issues 
around information asymmetry particularly relevant.48 However, the 
community selection and endorsement of borrowers minimises the 
information asymmetries and subsequent possibilities for the adverse 
selection of borrowers.49 Although traditional banking relationships do not 
use community selection or social pressure in the models of repayment, this 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 Id. 
42 Tadeo A. Satta, Microfinance Regulation Influence on Small Firms’ Financing in Tanzania, 12 
J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 1358 (2004) (suggesting the poor generally don’t have access to collateral). 
43 Nirvikar Singh, Transaction Costs, Information Technology and Development, 1 INDIAN 
GROWTH & DEV. REV. 1, 21 (2008) (considering the operational costs of MFIs in illustrating their 
challenges in providing long-term financial inclusion). 
44 I.e. the signal. 
45 Shafi & Medabesh, supra note 21. 
46 I.e. social pressure. 
47 See, e.g., Isidore Ekpe et al., The Effect of Microfinance Factors on Women Entrepreneurs’ 
Performance in Nigeria: A Conceptual Framework, 1 INT’L J. BUS. & SOC. SCI. 255, 257 (2010); Ono & 
Uesugi, supra note 40; Johannes Stroebel, The Impact of Asymmetric Information about Collateral 
Values in Mortgage Lending (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York University 
Stern School of Business). 
48 James C. Brau & Gary M. Woller, Microfinance: A Comprehensive Review of the Existing 
Literature, 9 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. & BUS. VENTURES 1, 22–23 (2004) (clients are generally rurally 
dispersed and illiterate). 
49 Microfinance repayment rates are theoretically based on the community endorsement that is 
required before a loan is granted. Although a non-related member of the community must vouch for the 
borrower’s willingness and ability to repay, the endorsing person is not liable if the borrower defaults. 
However, in collectivist cultures the strength of social ties are usually enough to ensure repayment. See, 
e.g., Christian Ahlin & Robert Townsend, Using Repayment Data to Test Across Models of Joint 
Liability Lending, 117 ECON. J. F11 (2007). 
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contractual technique in microfinance has contributed to repayment rates of 
99%.50 
B. Financial Market Players and Their Incentives 
Borrower incentives for on time loan repayment are partially affected 
by the level of recourse available to banks, which is reinforced by banking 
regulation.51 In addition to incentives for loan repayments, there are also 
contractual methods to ensure on time regular payments such as late fees 
and permanent credit history (or credit score) records.52 Borrowers with full 
recourse contracts have incentives to repay the loan whereas those without 
only have the loan repayment incentives if capital values increase. 
Lenders operate in different environments depending on the legislation 
of the country, and the subsequent nature of the competition they face.53 
The strength of the competition has the potential to influence the products 
that are developed, the level of relationships sought with and by borrowers, 
and the marketing strategies employed to obtain new customers and 
maintain existing ones.54 Thus there are diverse incentives on lenders in 
operating and managing customer relationships, affected by regulation. 
Bank financing has been constantly changing over the past few 
decades, with an increased use of securitisation and lower reliance on 
deposits.55 However, authors have found that there is a relationship between 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 This author analysed the data available for microfinance repayments, among other things, 
between the period of 1996–2009 and found a write-off ratio for loans at 1% of loans. That means that 
repayment was 99%. This author used the widely available Microfinance Information Exchange data for 
that period. For methodological detail, refer to the paper itself. Gabriel Di Bella, The Impact of the 
Global Financial Crisis on Microfinance and Policy Implications (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
No. 11/175, 2011). 
51 See, e.g., Mike Berry, Tony Dalton & Anitra Nelson, Mortgage Default in Australia: Nature, 
Causes and Social and Economic Impacts (Austl. Hous. & Urban Research Inst., Final Report No. 145, 
2010). 
52 Confidence W. Amadi, An Examination of the Adverse Effects of Consumer Loans, 7 INT’L J. 
BUS. MGMT. 22 (2011). 
53 Thorsten Beck et al., Is Small Beautiful? Financial Structure, Size and Access to Finance (The 
World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 5806, 2011). 
54 See, e.g., Abbad Muneer et al., Limitations of E-Commerce in Developing Countries: Jordan 
Case, 4 ED. BUS. & SOC’Y: CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES 280 (2011). 
55 See, e.g., Farhad Hossain & Tonya Knight, Can Micro-Credit Improve the Livelihoods of the 
Poor and Disadvantaged? Empirical Observations from Bangladesh, 30.2 INT’L DEV. PLAN. REV. 155 
(2008). 
12 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 33:1 
 
Vol. 33, No. 1 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.78 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
the cost of capital and internal financial resources if there are external 
financing constraints,56 and that this can also affect real economic activity 
through the provision of finance via business and personal channels. The 
trend away from reliance on deposits and towards financial leverage57 has a 
variety of advantages and disadvantages particularly relevant for MFIs and 
is discussed in Parts following. Authors have commented on the factors 
which banks are interested in within the lending relationship. Namely, 
Stiglitz and Weiss58 detailed how the contract effectively induces the 
borrower to act in the best interest of the bank. 
1. Access to Credit and Bank Size 
The effect of the size of financial firms on financial access is an 
important topic which is relevant for determining the impact of factors 
related to microfinance and microfinance institutions within the context of 
the financial sector. A recent study by Demirgüç-Kunt, and Singer59 
examined how a higher number of large banks would influence credit 
availability of different sized firms. This study has strong theoretical and 
empirical importance because of potential assumptions by policy makers 
that bank size and strength increase credit access.60 On a more practical 
level, these authors noted that access to financial services by Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) is critical in developing countries 
because SME’s comprise most of the private sector.61 This study found that 
the average size of banks is not associated with access to finance.62 This is 
contrary to traditional banking regulatory motivations which aim to 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 See, e.g., John L. Campbell et al., Financing Constraints and the Cost of Capital: Evidence 
from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 868 (2011). 
57 Given that MFIs are not always able to receive deposits because of regulatory restrictions, 
alternative methods such as seeking capital on the capital markets has been pursued more and more in 
recent years. This allows MFIs to fund their expansion and ongoing costs. This trend has been discussed 
by: Arch, supra note 16; James Cerven & S.M. Ghazanfar, Third World Microfinance: Challenges of 
Growth and Possibilities for Adaptation, 24 J. SOC., POL. & ECON. STUD. 445 (1999). 
58 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 
71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981). 
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promote bank strength and dominance.63 Specifically, these authors found 
that financial markets in developing countries with more large banks 
resulted in reduced financial service use by firms of all sizes.64 They found 
that it is specialised lenders65 which increased firms’ access to finance. 
However, they also found that microfinance does not help with the 
financing constraints of formal and larger enterprises, which is logical 
given the target market of microfinance and the products designed to 
service them. Beck et al.66 commented in describing the implications of 
their results that policy makers control financial institution size and thus 
specific financial market structure by determining regulations which impose 
entry barriers, minimum capitalisation requirements and bank ownership 
restrictions. 
2. Wealth Creation 
The theoretical strength of microfinance lies in its ability to increase 
wealth through the mobilisation of capital for entrepreneurial and 
investment opportunities by the poor.67 This individual wealth creation 
aspect is critical for the potential benefits of microfinance because it runs 
hand in hand with increases in economic development.68 Bauer, Chytilová, 
and Morduch69 empirically analysed why microfinance has such financial 
benefits over programs such as those which focus on savings. These authors 
thus examine microfinance as an innovation for self-discipline of financial 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 Australian Treasury, Release of the Report of the Financial System Inquiry and Initial 
Government Response on Mergers Policy, Financial System Inquiry (Apr. 9, 1997), http://fsi.treasury 
.gov.au/content/P ublicInformation/Pressreleases/PR090497.asp. 
64 Beck et al., supra note 53. 
65 Such as MFIs. 
66 Beck et al., supra note 53. 
67 In terms of a general definition of microfinance a useful paper is Karlan and Goldberg, supra 
note 36. 
68 This is based on the importance of the poor “lifting themselves out of poverty” rather than 
having poverty eradication methods imposed upon them, which intuitively indicates a more sustainable 
anti-poverty strategy. 
69 See, e.g., Michal Bauer et al., Behavioral Foundations of Microcredit: Experimental and 
Survey Evidence from Rural India, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1118 (2012). 
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behaviour,70 and the results have been published in the American Economic 
Review. 
The results of the study by Bauer et al. show that self-discipline is the 
reason why people cannot save but can repay loans in rural India.71 
Specifically, women who are more present biased72 are more likely to 
borrow from an MFI. This is because they have more need to borrow than 
non-present biased women because of a greater tendency to spend income.73 
It can be logically extended that microfinance is more efficient than saving 
because of social pressure and a regular repayment structure which provide 
greater incentives for financial discipline than regular savings programs.74 
Other authors have also commented on this hyperbolic discounting aspect 
of microfinance.75 Contrary to many statistics, Bauer et al. found that most 
borrowing is used for investment.76 These results also provide support for 
the rigid and regular repayment schedules, which other studies77 have 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 Id. These authors used a behavioural economics perspective. In order to determine the reason 
for the repayment success of microfinance, Bauer et al. used a random walk method to select nine 
villages per taluk and 35 people per village in rural India. The researchers had a high response rate with 
90% participation acceptance. The sample of respondents was generally representative of the population 
except that there was marginally lower literacy and higher marriage than the region average. This study 
determined the discount rate by asking respondents if they would prefer “Rs250” tomorrow or 
Rs265/280/300/330/375 in three months’ time. They also identified time preference reversals. The 
methodological procedure of this study seems sound in that the same subjective transaction costs apply 
to both options available to the subjects because all payments are in the future. Subjective transaction 
costs refer to perceived higher transaction costs of future payments and the effect that hyperbolic 
discounting has on the desire to consume sooner rather than later. Further, risk tolerance was determined 
by a simple gambling game. The data which was collected related to demographics, wealth, and 
women’s position in the household. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. Present bias refers to the preference to consume today rather than later. This is also referred 
to as hyperbolic discounting. These authors categorise present-bias as when the calculated personal 
current discount rates are larger than future discount rates, and is generally one third of the population. 
In a practical sense, this means that these people are impatient about consumption choices for tomorrow 
but not for consumption choices in one year’s time. This study further distinguishes between “weakly” 
and “strongly” present-biased participants. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 This is where future events are discounted at higher rates than in the near future. See, e.g., 
Richard Herd et al., Financial Sector Reform in India: Time for a Second Wave? (Org. for Econ. Co-
operation and Dev., Economics Department Working Papers No. 879, 2011). 
76 Id. The results hold after controlling for time-discounting and the propensity to borrow. 
77 See, e.g., Sarah Pearlman, Flexibility Matters: Do More Rigid Loan Contracts Reduce Demand 
for Microfinance? (Vassar Coll. Dept. of Econ., Working Paper, 2010). 
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indicated may reduce the uptake of microfinance. Further, these results 
explain why despite a move towards individual contracts, the regular 
repayment schedules and regular group meetings model has been 
maintained.78 The results of the empirical study by Bauer et al. show that 
many of the issues which affect the wealth creation of individuals in 
developed countries also affect microfinance borrowers. 
C. Contracts 
1. Contracts and Risk Management 
The law regarding the enforcement of contracts is a result of the 
information asymmetries between contract parties and ensures that property 
rights are upheld.79 Without a mechanism to enforce contracts and in a low 
trust environment, it is possible for the financial system to be very 
inefficient.80 A financial system functioning in developed countries is built 
on a foundation of trust and enforced property rights legislation.81 However, 
the microfinance sectors in developing countries usually do not have this 
foundation,82 and the result of this may be less pronounced economic 
effects of microfinance.83 Contract enforcement in developed countries thus 
relies on a combination of cultural norms and institutional support. This is 
in contrast to microfinance contracts whose enforcement is instead 
supported by social pressure from other community members.84 
Contracts are designed to ensure both parties have reduced risk despite 
the inherent information asymmetries present in all financial relationships.85 
In this way, contracts are essentially a risk management tool. This is 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 This is because, as illustrated by Bauer et al., supra note 69, it is the discipline which results in 
financial improvements in personal financial situation rather than simply the ability to save. 
79 See, e.g., K.M. Waziri, Industrial Property Rights Protection and Entrepreneurship 
Development in Nigeria: The Economic Implication, 5 J. POL. & L. 93 (2012). 
80 This is often the case in developing countries where microfinance is present. See, e.g., Stefanos 
Mouzas et al., Trust and Reliance in Business Relationships, 41 EUR. J. MARKETING 1016 (2007); 
Nawaz et al., supra note 34. 
81 Waziri, supra note 79. 
82 Nawaz et al., supra note 34. This was also discussed in supra, Part II.A. 
83 Brau & Woller, supra note 48. 
84 Jorge Luis Rodríguez-Meza, Group and Individual Microcredit Contracts: A Dynamic 
Numerical Analysis (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with author). 
85 See supra Part II.A.1 where this is covered in depth. 
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because it is not that risk should be avoided, but simply that uncertainty is 
something people will pay to circumvent because it is unquantifiable, 
unlike risk.86 
2. Risk Based Interest Rates 
In traditional banking relationships borrowers pay interest rates as a 
way to provide an incentive to the bank to give up capital which they 
otherwise could have used.87 The interest rates charged depends on the level 
of cost associated with providing the loan and the risk associated with doing 
so.88 The consideration of a traditional financial relationship allows that the 
role of microfinance can be better understood, as interest rates are also 
charged relative to the cost of providing the loan.89 
The risk management practices outlined above ensure that the pricing 
of risk into financial products is easily reflected in the interest rates 
charged.90 That is, large balance loans are linked with collateral and 
charged low interest rates.91 In contrast, low balance unsecured loans are 
charged high interest rates reflective of the higher proportional transaction 
costs, the risk of delayed repayment, higher recovery costs in the event of 
default, and consideration of the smaller loan balance.92 
D. Credit Market Failure 
The combination of lack of collateral, undocumented abilities to repay 
the loan, and associated factors of illiteracy and regional diversity means 
                                                                                                                           
 
86 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1921). For a 
general discussion on uncertainty, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
87 See supra Part II.A. 
88 See, e.g., Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Credit Elasticities in Less-Developed Economies: 
Implications for Microfinance, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1040 (2008). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 The costs of providing the loan are not directly proportional to the loan size and thus easily 
covered by the interest on such a large principal. For a discussion of this issue, see Ono & Uesugi, supra 
note 40. 
92 This is in contrast to high balance loans, which, even with lower interest rates charged, do 
recoup a higher proportion of fees relative to the loan balance. See, e.g., John Kose et al., Credit 
Ratings, Collateral, and Loan Characteristics: Implications for Yield, 76 J .BUS. 371 (2003). 
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that in the traditional financial sector, the poor do not have access to 
financial services.93 There is a market failure because the poor are not being 
provided with credit, despite the fact that they are willing and able to be a 
part of the microcredit markets.94 Indeed, authors have found that this is a 
market failure because the poor are the most productive users of finance95 
as are small businesses compared with large businesses. 
This failure in the allocation of credit to the most efficient users is 
arguably a result of the unjustified belief by banks that the poor are a 
market segment too costly and risky to serve.96 With the identification of 
credit market failure such as in the lack of access to finance for the poor, 
legal institutions and regulation may be a method to realign the market and 
encourage microfinance to complete the market. 
Traditional financial relationships follow a simplistic model where the 
bank obtains capital in large bundles, which are dispersed to many 
borrowers at interest rates which cover the risk of default, transaction costs, 
and profit.97 The target market of microfinance borrowers as being rurally 
dispersed, illiterate, and generally uneducated members of society98 results 
in a perception that transaction costs remain unbalanced by the return from 
market interest rates on such small loan balances. The result of this is that 
the poor do not get access to finance in traditional financial relationships,99 
and this is a credit market failure, which has led to the development of 
MFIs to complete the market. 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 See infra Part III. 
94 See, e.g., Shilpa Aggarwal et al., Financing Businesses in Africa: The Role of Microfinance 
(The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 5975, 2012). 
95 Id. 
96 This is generally not the case, at least when it comes to the rates of repayment. Hence, the risk 
is perceived, but not necessarily real. Di Bella, supra note 50. 
97 For a thorough analysis of financial market functioning refer to the thesis of see Deniz Akün, 
Banking Regulation in Turkey and Russia: An Economic Analysis (June 24, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Bologna), available at http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/5328/1/Deniz_Akun_ 
Ph.D_Thesis.pdf. 
98 See infra Part III. 
99 Arthur Affleck & Mary Mellor, Community Development Finance: A Neo-Market Solution to 
Social Exclusion?, 35 J. SOC. POL’Y 303 (2006). 
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1. Bank Size 
Although the poor have limited access to finance, even in urban 
environments finance can be limited to two choices: the TML or the MFI.100 
The lack of competition between and within financial providers means that 
in many ways there is a problem of concentration in the microfinance 
sector. The research on monopolies has generally found that they result in 
worse outcomes for the customer.101 In the context of microfinance, this is 
particularly important because maximizing better customer outcomes are 
the goal of the microfinance sector.102 Indeed, even considering the growth 
of the microfinance sector, with a large number of poor to service, 
oversaturation of MFIs is still an unlikely reality. 
There are a variety of factors which influence access to finance for 
firms of different sizes. A particular World Bank Report by Beck et al. 
combined two unique data sets to determine the effect of bank size on 
access to finance by small firms.103 Bank dominance104 differs between 
developing countries such as Ukraine, with 99% bank dominance, and 
Colombia, with 61% of bank dominance. The results of this research are not 
necessarily consistent with initial intuition in that it was found that a greater 
number of large banks are associated with lower financial services use by 
                                                                                                                           
 
100 Walter E. Block, A Critique of Yunus and His Micro-Finance, 5 ECON. MGMT. & FIN. 
MARKETS 57 (2010). 
101 HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 6 (W.W. Norton 
& Co. 8th ed. 2010). 
102 Abdullah Al-Mamun et al., Examining the Effect of Microcredit on Poverty in Malaysia, 29 
ASEAN ECON. BULL. 15 (2012). 
103 Beck et al., supra note 53. These, among others, will be discussed in the following Part. This 
study used data from the Financial Sector Assessment Program on financial structure and World Bank 
Enterprise Survey to develop a sample of 54 developing countries and up to 50 countries per regression. 
These authors matched the samples from both surveys based on indicators developed and made a cross-
sectional database. The FSAP authors developed indicators for access to finance, account, overdraft, and 
loans, with the last three acting as dummy variables. The authors ensured the validity of results by 
conducting such methodological strategies as controlling for firm-level characteristics which could 
otherwise affect access to finance such as firm size, public listing, age. The underlying assumption for 
the methodological design is that some industries rely more on external finance than others for 
technological reasons and that these differences are consistent across countries. 
Using the rigorously constructed database of financial sector and firm data, Beck et al. 
subsequently built and tested non-linear models using regressions with OLS in order to determine 
marginal effects of interaction otherwise difficult to interpret. 
104 Id. at 3. Bank dominance refers to the percentage of business placed with regulated banks 
compared to with small-scale specialised lenders (such as MFIs). 
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firms of all sizes.105 However, it was found that a greater number of 
specialised lenders regardless of the financial firm size results in greater 
access to finance of small firms. These authors discuss the implications of 
these results in the context of development in developing countries where 
access to financial services by small firms is critical because they comprise 
most of the private sector.106 Further, Beck et al. explain how a particular 
trend in the size of financial institutions is affected by the regulator because 
entry barriers and minimum capital requirements affect bank ownership 
which subsequently affects financial institution size.107 The effect of this on 
microfinance is that bank dominance affects credit access, financial system 
inclusion, and microfinance competition.108 Thus, from the perspective of 
these authors, the regulator is in control of the access to finance by small 
firms through regulating with a particular market structure in mind.109 This 
is of direct relevance because it illustrates the control the regulator has on 
not only the functioning of the microfinance markets, but also of individual 
MFIs, and intuitively on the financial sustainability of MFIs. 
2. Incentives 
The law and economics analysis of microfinance will consider the 
incentives of all the stakeholders in the sector. The incentives to lend and 
incentives to borrow are an important point for consideration in the market 
failure discussion.110 From the banks perspective, there are limited 
incentives to provide loans to the target market of microfinance because of 
the high perceived transaction costs associated with doing so.111 From the 
borrowers perspective, there may be issues where self-selection bias 
discourages good borrowers from borrowing under the group-lending 
                                                                                                                           
 
105 Id. at 4. 
106 Id. at 2. 
107 Id. at 3. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social 
Collateral, 46 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (1995). 
111 This is compared with providing a loan to the middle classes or poor above the poverty line. 
Marek Hudon, Norms and Values of the Various Microfinance Institutions, 35 J. SOC. ECON. 35, 38 
(2008). 
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model because of joint liability for loans112 and also where high interest 
rates exist,113 which potentially creates a similar “market for lemons”114 
where the good borrowers opt-out from microfinance loans. Individual loan 
contracts for microfinance are thus an innovation, which may increase 
borrower quality within microfinance loans.115 This, however, does not 
address the social goals of microfinance, which is not to identify the most 
suitable borrowers, but to provide credit access to the poor. Indeed, to the 
contrary, research has found that higher interest rates on individual 
contracts result in lower loan quality because good borrowers opt-out from 
applying.116 Adverse selection applied in this way potentially draws lines of 
similarity between microfinance and regular financial relationship 
contracts.117 
The goals of microfinance would not normally be reached in a market 
environment without intervention. This is because, although microfinance 
exists and the growth of borrowing statistics is impressive, the political 
goals of credit access have yet to be reached.118 Supportive legislation is 
still required to ensure that MFIs are able to be financially sustainable while 
achieving development and distributional goals. Given this, the legislator 
must do something to support microfinance. The development of specific 
microfinance law in various developing and developed countries is 
evidence of this already taking place. 
MFI legislation may allow MFIs to overcome risk management 
problems and facilitate market functioning. In order to achieve this, 
regulation may support Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs, 
facilitative regulation, or direct regulation, and these will be discussed in 
subsequent Parts of this article. 
                                                                                                                           
 
112 Malimba Musafiri Papias & P. Ganesan, Repayment behaviour in credit and savings 
cooperative societies, 36 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 608 (2008). 
113 Hermes & Lensink, supra note 4, at F1. 
114 See supra note 86. This author generally refers to the market for lemons, and the current paper 
applies that idea to the microfinance sector in this context. 
115 See, e.g., Arup Daripa, Social Capital, Individual Incentives and Loan Repayment (2009), 
available at http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/conference/dec_09_conf/Papers/ArupDaripa.pdf. 
116 See, e.g., Hermes & Lensink, supra note 4; Karlan & Goldberg, supra note 36. 
117 As a result of information asymmetry and the self-selection of borrowers, these issues function 
both in the formal financial sector and also in microfinance. 
118 MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, Access to Credit Country Scorecards, http://www 
.mcc.gov/pages/selection/scorecards/fy2013 (2013). 
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III. THE POOR ALSO NEED FINANCE 
The model of traditional financial relationships leaves a gap in services 
provided to the poor. The previous Part established that the banks in 
developed countries may deem providing credit and other financial services 
to the poor excessively unprofitable.119 The result of this is a lack of access 
to capital for the poor as small loan sizes are not offered or applications are 
rejected.120 This situation is relevant across the world, and is especially 
poignant in developing countries where there are potentially more poor left 
un-serviced by this market failure. Evidence of this market failure can be 
found in developed countries where the relatively poor are also excluded 
from the formal financial system, which has resulted in a trend towards 
microfinance and microcredit programs across countries such as Holland, 
Italy and Germany.121 Poverty is an absolute and a relative socially 
constructed definition.122 It is logical that financial system exclusion exists 
in all economies, because there will always be a group of people whom 
banks deem unprofitable because of excessive uncertainty of collateral and 
repayment ability.123 
A. Do the Poor Fit into the Traditional Banking Relationship? 
1. Supply Side 
a. Trust 
Banks in developing countries have greater funding and operational 
challenges to overcome than banks in developed countries.124 Among other 
                                                                                                                           
 
119 Where high transaction costs relative to income earned are small. 
120 Shafi & Medabesh, supra note 21, at 116. 
121 Microfinance by Country: Italy, EUROPEAN MICROFINANCE NETWORK, http://www.european-
microfinance.org/index.php?rub=microfinance-in-europe&pg=microfinance-by-country&cpg=22. 
122 Muhammad Kashif Khan Durrani et al., Role of Micro Finance in Reducing Poverty: A Look 
at Social and Economic Factors, 2 INT’L J. BUS. SOC. SCI. 138 (2011). 
123 Therese Ann Wilson, Supporting Social Enterprises to Support Vulnerable Consumers: The 
Example of Community Development Finance Institutions and Financial Exclusion, 35 J. CONSUMER 
POL’Y 197 (2012). 
124 Rusdy Hartungi, Understanding the success factors of micro-finance institution in a 
developing country, 34 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 388 (2007). 
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challenges, authors have commented that the level of trust within a country 
and within the financial sector is particularly important for innovation and 
outreach to poor customers.125 The issue for banks in developing countries 
is that general levels of trust are relatively low and contract law and 
enforcement are not always reliable to fill the gap in general trust levels. 
This is especially relevant for microfinance and, in particular, microsavings. 
In a low trust environment, it may still be likely that people borrow from 
MFIs, but the likelihood of them depositing savings is much less likely.126 
As deposits are the cheapest source of capital, a low trust environment 
which restricts access to deposits also results in higher operating costs via 
source of capital, and financial self-sustainability with reliance on donors 
and governments.127 
b. Lack of Information 
Traditional banking relationships manage risk by collecting a lot of 
information from customers before and during the provision of financial 
products.128 However, the target customers of MFIs may have no evidence 
of income, assets, or ability to prove they can repay the loan.129 Because of 
the general lack of information available from microfinance borrowers, 
there is a very large perceived risk associated with lending to them.130 This 
is particularly the case for traditional banks with no first-hand experience in 
the high repayment rates of microfinance loans.131 
With technological advances and financial services product 
innovation, it is becoming easier to provide financial access in developing 
countries.132 For example, in Kenya, which has bank density at one third the 
density of India, 70% of people use mobile phone banking and bypass 
                                                                                                                           
 
125 Aggarwal et al., supra note 94. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Allen & Gale, supra note 31. 
129 See supra Part II.C. 
130 As discussed in previous Part, this is a perceived risk. 
131 Di Bella, supra note 50. 
132 STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN, POLICY PAPER ON REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILE 
BANKING IN PAKISTAN (2007), available at http://www.sbp.org.pk/bprd/2007/policy_paper_rf_mobile 
_banking_07-jun-07.pdf. 
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traditional banking relationships.133 However, this system is hinged on the 
requirement of agents to receive and give cash.134 The potential scope of 
microfinance expansion which builds on the use of mobile phone 
technology is large and countries such as Pakistan have explicit regulatory 
strategies to build on this technology.135 
c. Interest Rate 
Interest rates on microfinance loans have a global median of 32%.136 
The rate of interest is generally explainable by higher costs from a lot of 
small transactions and higher perceived risk to the lender than for 
traditional collateralised loans as discussed in the previous Parts.137 This 
reasoning, however, is not certain. Further, the interest rate reflects a risk 
allocation and a risk premium given the demographics of the borrowers and 
subsequent costs. The primary actions of MFIs and banks when granting 
loans is to adequately select a borrower who will repay the interest and loan 
principal and then monitor on-going repayments.138 The microfinance 
model uses community knowledge to select borrowers of low risk by 
getting recommendations from non-family members.139 Further, these 
recommendations create social pressure on the borrower, which results in 
them monitoring their own repayments.140 These two mechanisms build on 
community knowledge and social pressure and leave the high interest rates 
attributable to the high proportional operating costs of providing a lot of 
small loans.141 
                                                                                                                           
 
133 Aggarwal et al., supra note 94. 
134 Herd et al., supra note 75. 
135 STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN, supra note 132. 
136 These results are based on data from 2007 to 2009. Di Bella, supra note 50, at 13. 
137 Arch, supra note 16. The real risk of default, however, is low as reported by Di Bella. Di 
Bella, supra note 50, at 13. 
138 See, e.g., J. Jordan Pollinger et al., The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance 
Institutions, 45 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 23 (2007). 
139 This system works for both individual and group contracts. Rodríguez-Meza, supra note 84. 
140 Rahman & Nie, supra note 20, at 213. 
141 Id. 
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A potential reason for such high interest rates may be MFI 
inefficiency.142 That is, despite the facts that borrower recruitment, 
selection, and monitoring are effectively outsourced to the community,143 
MFIs fail to be financially sustainable.144 Given the social objectives of 
microfinance, it is understandable that NGO funders may monitor and 
evaluate microfinance performance based on social outcomes rather than 
the ultimate operational costs and subsequent interest rates.145 From this it 
can be logically extended that operating efficiency is not incentivised for 
MFIs, and the result is high interest rates. The creation of incentives is at 
the heart of a law and economics analysis of these issues. 
However, a trend towards MFIs self-reporting their financial and 
outreach data to organisations such as the MIX Market Exchange allows 
that donors can better allocate their funds. This trend creates further issues 
regarding whether MFIs should be rewarded for being more efficient if 
there is most likely a trade-off between outreach and efficiency.146 The 
relatively low interest rate of microfinance is because of the cheap source of 
capital which MFIs currently have access to, which allows the transaction 
costs associated with microfinance to be borne partly by the NGO or 
government providing the capital. 
The interest rates on microfinance loans are generally between 32%–
37%.147 This is relatively high compared to the interest rates charged to 
middle and upper class borrowers in the same developing countries, which 
may often be below 10%. However, in comparison to the interest rates 
charged by loan sharks in the slums of many developing countries,148 the 
interest rates of microfinance are relatively cheap. Indeed, microfinance 
interest rates are not so different from the 20% charged on unsecured credit 
cards in Australia.149 
                                                                                                                           
 
142 See, e.g., Suresh De Mel et al., Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment, 123 Q. J. ECON. 1329 (2008). 
143 In both group and individual based loans. Rodríguez-Meza, supra note 84. 
144 See, e.g., Crabb, supra note 27. 
145 Seal of Excellence will help the microfinance sector further its social mission, MICROCREDIT 
SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, http://www.microcreditsummit.org/news/26/seal-of-excellence-will-help.html. 
146 Hermes & Lensink, supra note 4, at F2. 
147 Di Bella, supra note 50, at 12–14. 
148 The rate can be as high as 300%. Mayer, supra note 24. 
149 COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA, Rates and Fees, https://www.commbank.com.au/ 
personal/credit-cards/awards/platinum.html#Rates%20and%20fees. 
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The issue of microfinance interest rates is a hotly debated opinionated 
topic rarely covered in the empirical literature. However, a key empirical 
article by Karlan and Zinman has been published in the American 
Economic Review, which analyses credit-elasticity in microfinance.150 This 
research implemented randomised trials in a South African MFI to 
determine if the poor are sensitive to interest rate changes.151 Importantly, 
this research found that increasing the interest rate actually results in lower 
repayment because of higher information asymmetry.152 In terms of 
regulatory implications, this research suggests that lower microfinance 
interest rates result in greater outreach to poor women and at a very small 
cost to foregone profits. In this way, the research seems to support interest 
rate caps, although detail is not provided regarding what the interest rate 
caps should be. 
The discussion regarding interest rates is critical to the law and 
economics discussion of microfinance and will be elaborated in future parts 
of this article, especially regarding regulatory imposed interest rate caps. If 
MFI financial self-sustainability is to be achieved, market interest rates 
need to be charged to borrowers which reflect the cost of providing the 
product. Indeed, the interest rates currently charged to microfinance 
borrowers are similar to those charged on uncollateralised credit card loans 
provided to consumers in developed countries. 
Thus, even with cheap sources of capital MFIs still need to charge 
above 30% interest.153 For banks with traditional sources of capital, it can 
be understood that the interest rate required to cover the high proportional 
cost of providing loans to the poor would be much higher.154 This is unless 
                                                                                                                           
 
150 Karlan & Zinman, supra note 88. 
151 Id. at 1041. The motivation for this is that the authors claim regulation supports MFIs raising 
interest rates on loans in order to reduce dependence on subsidies, but this strategy only makes sense if 
the poor are insensitive to interest rate changes. Among key findings, these authors found that loan size 
was more responsive to a change in loan maturity than changes in interest rates. Long maturities mean 
there are small monthly repayments and easier cash flow management than short maturities. Hence, this 
finding is consistent with theory on binding liquidity constraints. 
152 Id. at 1064. Borrowers willing to borrow at higher interest rates may arguably have been 
rejected from other financial institutions because of unsound financial situation or other reasons, which 
the MFI is unable to know. Hence, information asymmetries are increased with loans with higher 
interest rates, associated with lower repayment rates. 
153 Di Bella, supra note 50. 
154 Id. This explains the discrepancy in interest rates between loans for the rich and the poor. 
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the need to access the financial and investment markets in itself creates 
operating efficiencies brought about by the process of on-going regulation. 
d. Alternatives—Supply Not Diversified 
For the poor and chronic poor who need access to finance to smooth 
consumption expenses or fund businesses, there are few avenues to choose 
from. Some poor are willing and able to pay for access to finance,155 
although the chronic poor are not.156 This is illustrated in the widespread 
use of TMLs157 by the poor across the world.158 It is logical that the loan 
sharks who dominate the slums and chronic poor areas should not be the 
first choice of potential borrowers because of high interest rates and violent 
repayment tactics.159 Authors have found a paradox in that the flexibility of 
repayments for services by loan sharks means that it is not uncommon for 
borrowers to choose these loans rather than the rigid payment schedules of 
microfinance.160 In a continually adapting microfinancial services market, 
there exists a role for TMLs and loan sharks in providing flexible loans, 
despite the high interest rates. This is an issue because it illustrates that 
there is a gap in the traditional market and microfinance has not been 
designed in a sufficiently adequate manner to complete the gap. However, 
with low awareness of microfinance, especially in areas such as sub-
Saharan Africa161 where the need is great means that the poor are 
effectively left with no choice. 
In a smoothly functioning financial market, there should theoretically 
be a variety of credit access sources that the poor can use, because where 
there is demand a market should appear.162 This is because the poor are 
                                                                                                                           
 
155 See, e.g., Aggarwal et al., supra note 94; Di Bella, supra note 50. 
156 Samia Mahmood, Microfinance and Women Entrepreneurs in Pakistan, 3 INT’L J. GENDER & 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 265 (2011). 
157 Traditional Money Lenders (TMLs) such as payday lenders or informal finance sources. 
158 See, e.g., Amadi, supra note 52; Francis Kehinde Emeni, Microfinance Institutions in Nigeria: 
Problems and Prospects: Questionnaire Survey Findings, 21 J. FIN. MGMT. & ANALYSIS 69 (2008). 
159 Emeni, supra note 158. 
160 See, e.g., Hudon, supra note 111; Dean Karlan & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is Microfinance Too 
Rigid? (forthcoming) (on file with author); Pearlman, supra note 77. 
161 Aggarwal et al., supra note 94. 
162 For a general sense for the basic idea of supply and demand, see John Maynard Keynes, The 
General Theory of Employment, 51 Q. J. ECON. 209 (1937). 
2014] THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE 27 
 
Vol. 33, No. 1 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.78 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
willing and able to pay for access to credit,163 and the best evidence for this 
is the use of loan sharks across the world.164 Despite the fact that loan 
sharks are not able to outsource the selection and monitoring of borrowers 
in the way MFIs are, their continued existence seems to indicate that 
providing finance to the poor can be a profitable business. 
Across the world the most common source of credit is from family and 
friends.165 Thus, although there is a source of credit, there is no supply 
diversification, nor is this supply method efficient.166 This illustrates not 
only cultural issues and aversions to financial institutions, but also the low 
awareness and uptake of microfinance. An additional interpretation is that 
this shows there is a great demand for financial services by the poor.167 
Hence, non-diversified access to credit results in fewer choices from lower 
competition and ultimately less efficient financial service access. 
2. Demand Side 
a. Cash Flow but No Savings 
The financial situation of microfinance borrowers provides an 
explanation for why most microfinance is used to smooth consumption 
expenses rather than to fund microenterprises. The target market of 
microfinance is the poor who have cash flow to cover expenses as they 
arise, but have no “nest-egg” to provide for a “rainy day” or unexpected or 
large expenses such as medical expenses or expanding a business.168 
It is intuitive that people with a small amount of cash flow but no 
savings may need to borrow funds to pay for lump sum expenses such as 
education or medical costs. Indeed, humanities’ general risk aversive 
                                                                                                                           
 
163 Aggarwal et al., supra note 94. 
164 Pearlman, supra note 77. 
165 Herd et al., supra note 75. 
166 Examples include extreme weather or economic catastrophes, which result in this credit source 
disappearing. 
167 Indeed, with over 70% of loans from family, there are potentially wide-ranging implications in 
an economic shock which would surely hurt all members of society with inter-community loans, and 
also restrict loans to cover the unexpected bad circumstances, which at an individual level a society can 
deal with. Pearlman, supra note 77. 
168 Brau & Woller, supra note 48. 
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tendencies169 indicate that even a better personal financial situation may not 
be enough to shift the use of microfinance from consumption to 
entrepreneurship.170 
b. Vulnerability to External Shocks 
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), MFI investment was an 
asset class for inclusion in investment portfolios providing sound 
diversification because of the general insulation from international markets 
and lower financial leverage than banks.171 This risk diversification benefit 
allowed microfinance to attract investment as well as donor funds, and the 
impact on borrowers was steady growth in outreach. In an IMF Working 
Paper, Di Bella172 examined the effect of the GFC on microfinance, in 
particular the systemic risk faced by MFIs.173 
Di Bella found that as MFIs trend away from the traditional funding 
sources of Non-Government Organisation (NGO) funds, there is increased 
exposure to changes in domestic and international economic conditions.174 
The implications of this are large, especially for countries such as Peru, 
Bolivia, and Kenya where microfinance composes a large percentage of 
total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This paper found that the MFI 
transformation from being unregulated to regulated invariably results in an 
increase in systemic risk.175 It can be simply and intuitively extended that 
the increased vulnerability to external shocks, which MFIs face from 
                                                                                                                           
 
169 Arndt Sorge, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values, 28 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 625 (book review) (discussing general human tendencies away from uncertainty). 
170 W. Jean Kwon, An Analysis of Organisational, Market and Socio-Cultural Factors Affecting 
the Supply of Insurance and Other Financial Services by Microfinance Institutions in Developing 
Economies, 35 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 130 (2010). 
171 Nicolas Krauss & Ingo Walter, Can Microfinance Reduce Portfolio Volatility?, 58 ECON. 
DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 85 (2009). 
172 Di Bella, supra note 50. 
173 Id. This author sampled 353 MFIs who conformed to a set of criteria regarding size and the 
consistency of data over the last seven years, and grouped for analysis into geographical regions. In 
determining the performance of MFIs, the authors used asset and lending growth, return on equity, 
portfolio at risk, and write-off ratios. This paper examined the systemic risk of MFIs over a nine year 
period during which the GFC also occurred. The methodology of OLS panel regressions and general 
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having other funding sources, may spread the financial troubles of 
international markets to the front door of marginalised microfinance 
borrowers in developing countries. That is, international crises which 
previously did not greatly affect NGO-funded MFIs now may result in 
reduced access to credit for small, rurally dispersed business people and 
families all over the developing world. This paper uncovered a number of 
other significant findings in relation to regulation, MFI financial 
sustainability, and the differences between regulated MFIs and non-
regulated MFIs.176 
c. High Interest Rates for Loan Sharks 
Although there is a demand for credit access among the poor, there are 
limits as to how much they are able to pay for the service.177 Despite the 
prevalence of loan sharks, the poor are not necessarily able to pay the high 
interest rates on loans from loan sharks which can be as high as 300%.178 
This is because high interest rates effectively increase the regular outlay 
that borrowers have to integrate into their future cash flow.179 Given that the 
poor already have limited cash flow, which does not allow for the saving of 
funds for future expenses, it is logical that high interest rates are not 
affordable for many, and may result in a debt-trap.180 
B. Typical Microfinance Loan 
A typical microfinance loan is very different from a typical loan in 
traditional financial relationships. In particular, microfinance borrowers 
have no collateral, no financial security, no financial history, low 
technological ability, unreliable identification, and low literacy levels.181 As 
                                                                                                                           
 
176 Id. 
177 Charles Okeahalam, Economics of Access in a Developing Country: An Analysis of Firm-
conduct in Financial Services, 34 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 923 (2007). 
178 Mayer, supra note 24. 
179 As interest rates increase, so do the regular repayments of the loan. 
180 Karen E. Francis, Note, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis of the 
Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611 (explaining a “debt-trap” is when borrowers take more and 
more loans to pay the interest and capital on previous loans). 
181 See, e.g., Brau & Woller, supra note 48. 
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identified in the previous discussions, microfinance loans differ from 
traditional loans in that there is supply side risk, demand side risk, high 
levels of uncertainty,182 and there are high interest rates charged. The design 
of microfinance contracts in this way addresses the supply and demand side 
issues. The relatively high interest rates charged reflect the high costs of 
serving the poor through microfinance despite the capital provided by 
NGO’s. Organisations such as Microfinance Transparency183 serve the 
sector by examining how product features, such as forced savings, and 
when the first repayment begins affect the real cost of the loan. With low 
financial literacy, many borrowers are unlikely to be aware of how product 
features can affect the real cost of the loan.184 
The differences between borrowers illustrate that traditional financial 
relationships would need to adjust greatly to account for microfinance 
borrowers and loans. Given these differences in borrower demographics it 
can be understood that credit availability to the poor would not increase 
without MFIs. Authors have discussed that microfinance is a financial 
innovation which increases the repayment probability of uncollateralised 
loans.185 Indeed, prior to microfinance, an innovation with similar results in 
both social outcomes and high repayments was not institutionalised. 
Unlike traditional banks, MFIs do not generally acquire capital in a 
traditional sense, such as from capital markets, but rather acquire it from 
low interest loans or donations.186 Most MFIs are not publicly listed and are 
funded primarily from donor funds,187 with the exception of MFIs in Peru, 
Bolivia, and Pakistan where they are also funded by deposits and equity 
partnerships.188 This means that equity from shareholders is not a reliable 
source of capital to use to lend to the poor. Thus, most capital is required to 
                                                                                                                           
 
182 KNIGHT, supra note 86 (explaining levels of uncertainty differ from risk because uncertainty is 
unquantifiable). 
183 ABOUT MICROFINANCE TRANSPARENCY, http://www.mftransparency.org/about-our-
organization/. 
184 Nathalie Holvoet, Impact of Microfinance Programs on Children’s Education, 6 J. 
MICROFINANCE 27 (2004). 
185 Buera et al., supra note 17. 
186 Nelson Waweru & Gary Spraakman, The Use of Performance Measures: Case Studies from 
the Microfinance Sector in Kenya, 9 QUALITATIVE RES. IN ACCT. & MGMT. 44 (2012). 
187 See, e.g., Di Bella, supra note 50. 
188 Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Microscope on the Microfinance Business Environment 
2013, THE ECONOMIST (2013). 
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come from large loans from NGO’s, governments, or donations189 despite 
the fact that many MFIs do seek operational sustainability190 given their 
particular sources of capital. In some countries, the legislation allows 
regulated MFIs to also accept deposits, which creates another source of 
capital.191 Indeed, savings as a source of capital seems to be the most 
promising development which will allow MFIs to be financially self-
sustainable without having high exposure to changing international 
economic conditions.192 
Innovations in distribution193 are allowing MFIs to reach an increasing 
number of target borrowers while keeping financial and operational costs 
low enough to be sustainable with subsidised credit available. MFI 
innovation is specific to the regulatory environment in which they 
operate194 and the trend is towards streamlined loan provision processes195 
and leveraging off innovations in technology.196 However, the rate of 
innovation in efficiency and distribution is not currently at a pace which 
reflects the growth of MFIs and this may reflect the social goals of 
microfinance (rather than financial sustainability) or the lack of internal and 
external innovation pressure.197 
                                                                                                                           
 
189 This is in contrast to the operations of financial institutions in the formal financial sector, 
where banks use their large deposit base to provide loans and fund their operations. This was discussed 
in Part II. In contrast, MFIs do not have such reliable sources of capital, relying often on donations, or if 
they seek capital on the international capital markets, then they are exposed to currency and financial 
shock risk to an extent that they may not be able to deal with that risk. Di Bella, supra note 50. 
190 The difference between self-sustainability and operating sustainability is that operating 
sustainability is limited to being able to continue operations without relying on donations or low interest 
loans. Financial self-sustainability on the other hand refers also to the ability to expand operations based 
on the MFIs own internal resources, which includes seeking capital at market interest rates: Valentina 
Hartarska & Denis Nadolnyak, Do Regulated Microfinance Institutions Achieve Better Sustainability 
and Outreach? Cross-Country Evidence, 39 APPLIED ECON. 1207 (2011). 
191 Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 188. 
192 Shafi & Medabesh, supra note 21, at 116. 
193 Mehr Shah, Regulating Pakistan’s Non-Bank Microfinance Institutions, 14 PAKISTAN 
MICROFINANCE NETWORK (2011) (discussing mobile phone repayments). 
194 Satta, supra note 42 (discussing how regulation can restrict product designs such as loans 
requiring collateral). 
195 See, e.g., Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 10126, 2003). 
196 See, e.g., Herd et al., supra note 75. 
197 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Archer & Lisa Jones-Christensen, Entrepreneurial Value Creation 
through Green Microfinance: Evidence from Asian Microfinance Lending Criteria, 10 ASIAN BUS. & 
MGMT. 331 (2011); Marion Mbogo & Caroline Ashika, Factors Influencing Product Innovation in 
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The majority of microfinance loans are provided in a model of group 
lending which harnesses the power of social pressure.198 For example, 
group loans may be provided to a group of five women from the same 
village, generally neighbours.199 Loans are provided to the group and 
although they borrow individually, they are jointly liable for each other’s 
loans within the group.200 This model harnesses the power of social 
pressure, especially in developing countries where a sense of community201 
is often higher than in developed countries.202 Indeed, individual loans are 
also designed to harness social pressure because of a requirement for 
“recommendations,” if not joint liability, from other community 
members.203 These models bypass the need for collateral or information 
about the borrowers’ abilities to repay the loans because each borrower is 
selected by community members willing to stake their reputation on 
repayment.204 However, although microfinance has been founded on the 
model of group lending and joint liability, the trend is moving away from 
this model.205 Indeed, research has found that individual loan repayment 
rates are comparable to group loans when structured correctly around social 
pressure.206 
These operational structures of MFIs and microfinance loans allow the 
gap in the market to be theoretically filled and the poor are able to access 
                                                                                                                           
 
Micro Finance Institutions in Kenya: A Case Study of MFIs Registered With the Association of 
Microfinance Institutions (2011), available at http://sbaer.uca.edu/research/icsb/2011/390.pdf. 
198 Nidhiya Menon, Interdependencies in Microcredit Groups: Evidence from Repayment Data, 
40 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 111, 112 (2007). 
199 Id. at 115. 
200 Id. at 113. 
201 GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-
RELATED VALUES (2d ed. 2001) (analysing “collectiveness”). 
202 Id. 
203 See, e.g., R. Cull et al., Contract Design and Microfinance Performance: A Global Analysis 
(World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 3827, 2006). 
204 Id. 
205 Some of the world’s largest MFIs have moved away from group lending models towards 
individual contracts, such as the Grameen Bank. GRAMEEN BANK, GRAMEEN BANK’S RESPONSE TO THE 
VARIOUS ISSUES RAISED IN THE REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS (2011). 
206 See, e.g., X Xavier Giné & Dean Karlan, Group Versus Individual Liability: Long Term 
Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups (Yale Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 61 2006). 
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credit. There are further contract specifications which increase the loan 
security while allowing that the social goals of microfinance are met.207 
IV. EFFECTIVENESS AND DISTRIBUTION 
Based on the previous two Parts it has been illustrated that there is a 
policy problem which results in no credit being made available to the poor 
in a traditional financial market. Based on the reasons in Part II, political 
goals of credit availability are not realised without MFIs. 
Governments are interested in microfinance because of the social goals 
identified in the third Part of this paper. There are wide ranging female 
empowerment, financial inclusion, and mental health benefits from 
microfinance, which assist governments in equity goal achievement.208 
However, the current article is concerned with testing the effectiveness of 
laws in promoting microfinance. This article is not claiming that 
microfinance is for efficiently achieving political goals.209 Thus, this article 
contains an effectiveness study which entails determining how to affect the 
incentives of stakeholders to promote microfinance via financially 
sustainable MFIs. 
The issues that are relevant for the effectiveness discussion of 
microfinance are that there is a need in the market that people want finance 
and they cannot get access to it.210 It needs to be determined whether this 
lack of access to finance is because of regulatory or market failures. 
However, regardless of where the issue lies, development goals of financial 
inclusion are not met without MFIs.211 This is because political 
development goals of female empowerment and entrepreneurship are 
                                                                                                                           
 
207 Loans are generally provided to females and on fixed repayment schedules, with social 
collateral an underlying factor. Marek Hudon, Should Access to Credit be a Right?, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 
17, 19 (2009); Access to Credit, Country Scorecards, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION 
(Oct. 24, 2014 1:00 PM), http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/scorecards. 
208 See, e.g., Mahmood, supra note 156. 
209 That is outside the scope of the current paper, which is limited to the role of incentives in 
regulation and microfinance. 
210 Hudon, supra note 207, at 17. 
211 Al-Azzam et al., supra note 12, at 12. 
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reached via credit availability.212 It is relevant to identify at this stage 
whether microfinance is an effective instrument at reaching the political 
goal of credit availability. 
A. Policy Problem 
It is a policy problem regarding whether microfinance provides the 
effectiveness of reaching the political and distributional goals of access to 
credit for low income people. If microfinance helps achieve political goals, 
then it is logical for governments to provide legislation which supports 
MFIs in achieving those goals. The converse, however, is also true. 
Previous Parts of this article have established that microfinance is a solution 
to the policy problem which various social, regulatory, and economic 
government initiatives seek to address. 
The effect of microfinance is only as strong and long-lasting as the 
foundations on which it is built. Regulation has the potential to promote or 
restrict microfinance penetration across the world. Indeed, authors have 
found that incomes differ across countries not because of knowledge, 
capital markets, population, natural resources, human capital, or culture, but 
because of differences in the quality of institutions and economic 
policies.213 This is the focus of the current article—ways in which 
regulation and institutions can be designed to promote microfinance and 
thus access to credit. Other authors have also commented that economic 
growth and poverty alleviation are not possible in societies without strong 
institutions.214 There has been much debate on this topic in the past, and this 
issue is not directly related to the current article. As such, the effect of 
regulation and legal institutions will be assumed to exist and the analysis 
will move forward from there. 
                                                                                                                           
 
212 Ekpe et al., supra note 47, at 235; see also Paromita Sanyal, From Credit to Collective Action: 
The Role of Microfinance in Promoting Women’s Social Capital and Normative Influence, 74 AM. SOC. 
REV. 529, 530 (2009). 
213 Marieur Oison, Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others are 
Poor, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 7 (1996). 
214 See, e.g., Arch, supra note 16. 
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B. Distribution 
The problem of microfinance success can alternatively be defined as 
one of distribution. This is because development and social goals are 
political and not efficiency based, but that does not mean that the goals 
should not be achieved. From this perspective, the core aim of microfinance 
is exposed as credit availability. Through the distribution of microfinance, 
credit availability will increase.215 Indeed, it is the distribution of credit to 
those in rural areas and of the chronic poor which is the aim of 
microfinance.216 This has potential distribution effects to the wider 
population. 
Authors have empirically found that microfinance results in increased 
wages across the board and as such, has a redistributive and welfare effect 
on the economic development of developing countries.217 This trend 
indicates that through the achievement of access to credit, development can 
also be increased in certain areas. 
C. Measurement of Microfinance Effectiveness 
In order to measure the effectiveness of microfinance, it is critical that 
clearly defined benchmarks are developed. This is particularly the case with 
development goals where a range of associated factors make the effect on 
development difficult to isolate.218 
Given the political goals of microfinance and the previous analysis of 
impact, it can be seen that there is inconsistent evidence regarding the 
success of microfinance, given that that success depends on which 
benchmarks it is measured against. Based on the benchmarks identified, 
political goals around poverty alleviation and social goals of financial 
                                                                                                                           
 
215 See, e.g., G. Berg, Funding vs. Real Economy Shock: The Impact of the 2007–2009 Crisis on 
Small Firms’ Credit Availability (Policy Research Working Paper 6030, 2012). 
216 See, e.g., Manoranjan Sharma, Emerging Contours of Micro Finance: Where Do We Go From 
Here?, 4 BUS. REV., CAMBRIDGE 288 (2005). 
217 See, e.g., Buera et al., supra note 17. 
218 See, e.g., Stanislav Kolenikov & Gustavo Angeles, Socioeconomic Status Measurement with 
Discrete Proxy Variables: Is Principal Component Analysis a Reliable Answer?, 55 REV. INCOME & 
WEALTH 128, 129 (2009). 
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inclusion and distribution have been partially met.219 Regarding poverty 
alleviation, the research has indicated that only 1% of borrowers each year 
are lifted out of poverty,220 yet most borrowers are female and there are 
high levels of increased empowerment across countries.221 Other authors 
have found that 1.5% of borrowers were lifted out of poverty between the 
years of 1991 and 1992 and 1998 and 1999 in Bangladesh.222 However, the 
long-term effects of microfinance are complicated to establish empirically 
because loan terms are generally so short the direct effect cannot be reliably 
confirmed, and most borrowers do not continue to take further loans.223 
Indeed, the movement of a large number of people in and out of poverty224 
make the effect on poverty even more complicated to measure. Thus, many 
empirical papers seeking to examine microfinance success and MFI 
performance have measured different proxies making blanket conclusions 
challenging. 
1. Parameters to Measure Microfinance Success 
In determining the success of MFIs or of the impact of microfinance, it 
is important to establish criteria by which success can be measured. There 
are a range of factors integral to the focus and motivation of MFIs, and 
there are other factors which are deemed important by external observers or 
those seeking long-term success.225 Thus, depending on the perspective 
from which microfinance is viewed, benchmarks for success may be 
                                                                                                                           
 
219 See supra Part IV.C.2–IV.C.3. 
220 Khaled Shukran & Farhana Rahman, A Grameen Bank Concept: Micro-Credit and Poverty 
Alleviation Program in Bangladesh, INT’L CONF. ON EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPUTER AND IMAGE 
PROCESSING 47 (2011). 
221 See, e.g., Linda Mayoux, Questioning Virtuous Spirals: Micro-finance and Women’s 
Empowerment in Africa, 11 J. INT’L DEV. 957 (1999). 
222 Shahidur R. Khandker, Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from 
Bangladesh, 19 THE WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 263, 273 (2005). The calculations indicate that it is 
approximately 1.5 million people per year lifted out of poverty as a result of microfinance. 
223 Sharma, supra note 216. 
224 Bob Baulch & John Hoddinott, Economic Mobility and Poverty Dynamics in Developing 
Countries, 36 J. DEV. STUD. 1 (2000). 
225 Waweru & Spraakman, supra note 186. 
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developed differently. For the purposes of the current research, it is the 
regulatory success or failure which is of most relevance.226 
Microfinance success is access to credit for the purpose of the current 
article. If there is access to credit, then potentially there can be reductions in 
poverty and increases in economic development, along with well-
established social benefits. However, this article is concerned with 
examining the effectiveness of regulation and legal institutions in 
increasing access to credit via microfinance promotion. The reason for this 
focus is because access to credit is a political goal. 
The current research is primarily concerned with the measurement of 
the success of microfinance in achieving the goals of the regulator. 
Microfinance laws, as with other sector specific laws, are created with 
specific goals in mind. These goals are not always obvious, but indeed laws 
are not created arbitrarily.227 The goal of the law is integral in determining 
by which benchmarks effectiveness is measured: laws designed to provide 
social outcomes need to be measured against social benchmarks and the 
same exists for economically motivated laws.228 If indeed it is not the case 
that regulation promotes microfinance, then the factors which do influence 
the role of law, such as interest groups or psychology, need to be examined 
and identified. These issues are outside of the scope of the current article. 
The establishment of MFIs as poverty reduction mechanisms via the 
effective use of credit and entrepreneurship in itself provides ambiguous 
benchmarks from which a comparison can be made.229 Indeed, the 
definition of poverty is based on what is socially acceptable.230 Thus, the 
shifting goalposts which define poverty is an important consideration for 
the current research. It may be the case that even as every person is reached 
by microfinance and average wages increase tenfold, the new measure of 
poverty requires a never ending loop of poverty reduction.231 However, this 
                                                                                                                           
 
226 This relates to how regulation affects MFIs and lets them be able to do the work they want to 
do; giving loans to the poor. 
227 A. Allott, The Effectiveness of Laws, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 229, 231 (1981). 
228 Anthony Kyereboah-Coleman & Kofi A. Osei, Outreach and Profitability of Microfinance 
Institutions: The Role of Governance, 35 J. ECON. STUD. 296 (2008). 
229 This is because access to credit and entrepreneurship are inherently difficult to define and 
measure. 
230 Jamaluddin Husain, Role of Micro-Finance Institutions in Reducing World Poverty: An 
Overview, 11 BUS. REV., CAMBRIDGE 38 (2008). 
231 Id. 
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consideration is broadly considered as philosophical in nature because there 
are many social and economic factors such as corruption, religion, women’s 
rights, and politics which ensure that there are challenges for even the 
initial goals of microfinance to be achieved. 
Given that the goal of microfinance is to increase the socioeconomic 
conditions of the worlds’ poor this may be used to develop a benchmark.232 
In particular it may be stated that at least 1.5% of microfinance borrowers 
need to be lifted out of poverty per year, which is the benchmark of poverty 
reduction measured by Khandker.233 However, given the nature of 
microfinance borrowers, this data may have reliability issues.234 Indeed, the 
factors which result in borrowers being lifted out of poverty are many and 
difficult to isolate on a large scale with rigorous empirical methodology.235 
There is a trend in microfinance to measure the effect of the loans, called 
the Seal of Excellence,236 where social and economic outcomes are 
quantified. 
Further, qualitative measures of microfinance regulatory success can 
be used to complement quantitative measures. For example, the relative 
reach of microfinance in serving those who are in most need of services is a 
measure of which data is unavailable.237 Qualitative analysis can thus 
complement the results of this article because of selection bias and issues of 
awareness, which potentially skew quantitative results. 
2. Benefits of Microfinance 
a. Poverty Reduction from Microfinance 
Microfinance has developed and provided outcomes for the world’s 
poor, which are measurable as small statistical increases in socio-economic 
                                                                                                                           
 
232 This, ideally, would relate to the goal of microfinance. 
233 Khandker, supra note 222. 
234 Waweru & Spraakman, supra note 186. 
235 Id. 
236 Microfinance Summit Campaign: Seal of Excellence, MICROFINANCE-SUMMIT (Oct. 24, 2014, 
12:00 PM), http://www.microcreditsummit.org/news/26/seal-of-excellence-will-help.html. 
237 See, e.g., Paul Collier & Partha Sarathi Dasgupta, Poverty Reduction in Africa, 104 PNAS 
PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AM. 16763 (2007). That is to say that the rural 
villagers and other “Bottom of the Pyramid” poor are still un-serviced by microfinance but there are 
only vague estimates as to the number of people still un-serviced, generally based on poverty statistics. 
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benefits. Research has indicated that 1% to 1.5% of microfinance borrowers 
are lifted out of poverty each year.238 Considering the historical increases in 
the amount of microfinance borrowers per year, this indicates a positive 
result. This is because it is the ability of microfinance to serve millions of 
people rejected by the traditional financial system which provides its true 
potential in achieving socioeconomic goals. When we consider the number 
of borrowers served by microfinance thirty years ago, we can see that the 
figure of 1.5% being lifted from poverty each year239 is quite small when 
there are only a few million borrowers. Now, however, there are millions of 
borrowers all over the world.240 The benefit to society as a whole is 
increasing constantly. The result of this is an estimated 1 million to 1.5 
million microfinance borrowers per year lifted out of poverty.241 
This increasing outreach to more and more borrowers also indicates 
that the overall impact on microenterprises is also growing. If, for example, 
only 1% of borrowers “graduate”242 from consumption based loans to 
obtaining loans to microenterprises, this is a disheartening result for those 
who plan on microfinance being the economic driver of development. 
However, when the increasing amount of borrowers is considered, this 
figure connotes a much more positive result.243 
The economic development of developing countries has lagged behind 
theoretical models considering the provision of microfinance and donor 
funds.244 World Bank reports have found that the economic gains from 
microfinance are lower than would be expected.245 There is, however, an 
overall increase in wages.246 Other authors have found that microfinance 
results in income generation and does reduce poverty in small degrees.247 
                                                                                                                           
 
238 Khandker, supra note 222. 
239 Id. at 284. 
240 Satta, supra note 42. 
241 Khandker, supra note 222, at 285 (The author used calculations of 1.5% of borrowers and 
there are approximately 100 million borrowers.). 
242 As discussed previously, this is when microfinance borrowers move from small microfinance 
loans to being a part of the formal financial system. 
243 Although only 1.5% of borrowers may be lifted out of poverty each year, the real numbers of 
1.5 million borrowers is difficult to overlook as a small effect on poverty. 
244 Shukran & Rahman, supra note 220. 
245 Aggarwal et al., supra note 94. 
246 Buera et al., supra note 17. 
247 Durrani et al., supra note 122. 
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However, in an empirical economic sense the success of 
microfinance248 is supported in only a handful of published papers and thus 
the results should be interpreted with caution. However, theoretical 
arguments continue to support microfinance as a method to support micro 
entrepreneurship and this may have future economic benefits.249 
b. Macroeconomic Perspective 
Microfinance as a financial intervention is now of sufficient scale to 
allow general equilibrium analysis of the economic effects. In particular, a 
study by Buera et al.250 looked at the effects of microfinance by examining 
microfinance and credit programs targeted at small business.251 The most 
significant finding of this particular research is that not just microfinance 
borrowers, but most people are positively affected in an economic sense by 
microfinance because of increases in equilibrium wages.252 
                                                                                                                           
 
248 The success of microfinance for the current article is taken to mean the socioeconomic benefits 
of the intervention. 
249 Buera et al., supra note 17. 
250 Id. These authors examined the general equilibrium (GE) and partial equilibrium (PE) effects. 
251 Id. The methodology for this empirical paper is built on including endogenous saving rates 
between entrepreneurs and workers and high and low ability people. This limited scope of analysis 
excludes microfinance loans for consumption and may have less generalized results because of this. 
Further, the exclusion of consumption loans results in an under-prediction of consumption increases 
attributed to microfinance and the resulting flow-through effects on the economy. This study uses a 
model of entrepreneurship where financial development results in large aggregate impacts. 
252 Id. Under General Equilibrium analyses, the research by Buera et al. found an increase in 
aggregate TFP. However, these authors also found that the increase in TFP is counterbalanced by a 
reduction in capital accumulations, that is, savings, because of the high redistributive impact of 
microfinance from savers to non-savers because of the increase in wages and interest rates. The 
implication of this is that the scaling up of microfinance programs will lead to a small per-capita 
increase in income. Despite this, there are still significant aggregate and distributional impacts of 
microfinance. Importantly, general equilibrium analyses also found increases in equilibrium wages and 
interest rates. Thus, under GE, microfinance affects marginal entrepreneurs directly, workers indirectly, 
through higher wages, and may hurt business people or the rich because of an increase in factor prices. 
However, given that the aim of microfinance is in essence wealth distribution, this may actually be a 
bonus result. 
Buera et al. also examined the macroeconomic effect of microfinance based on a partial 
equilibrium analysis. A PE analysis assumes that wages and interest rates, among other assumptions, 
remain constant, whereas a GE analysis allows theoretical changes in defined associated inputs. 
Although not as easily generalized to the real economic situation, these PE results did find higher 
increases in aggregate output and capital than under GE assumptions. Further, the increased rate of entry 
of productive entrepreneurs into the market resulted in an increase of capital and labour demand and 
output, with subsequent results being lower aggregate TFP than under GE analyses. Further, there were 
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The paper by Buera et al., published by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, is important in establishing the effect of microfinance 
on economic development.253 The GE effects of increased wages show a 
redistributive effect which leads to an increased welfare effect. Thus, 
although previous studies have focussed on the absolute change in poverty 
of borrowers, this study allows for nuanced effects such as relative wage 
increases to be discussed. 
c. Economic Gains from Microfinance 
A variety of economic literature supports the need for small businesses 
to have access to finance in order to achieve long-term economic growth. 
Recent research published by The World Bank by Aggarwal et al. examined 
the role of microfinance on the access to credit of small businesses in 
Africa.254 
The research by Aggarwal et al. finds mixed support for microfinance 
in terms of economic gains.255 On the one hand, the research does show that 
access to finance results in business growth. However, on the other hand the 
results also indicate that the economic gains from microfinance are lower 
than were theoretically expected because of the mobilisation of household 
savings and empowerment from financial service access, and that the only 
certain positive outcome from microfinance is the smoothing of 
consumption expenses. Indeed, following this trend the authors highlight 
                                                                                                                           
 
greater magnitude impacts on consumption and output, business starts, capital inputs, and labour inputs 
and outputs than under GE. 
253 Id. 
254 This paper uses the 2009 and 2010 Gallup World Poll data which includes 150,000 people 
from 157 countries and asks questions regarding demographics, well-being, income, politics, and 
financial inclusion. These authors used the data from this survey to compare the findings of the literature 
and draw conclusions which support the development of micro-savings innovation. However, despite 
the research paper using original data from the Gallup World Poll, the conclusions drawn by the paper 
relate to the potential for savings accounts rather than any conclusions drawn from the actual data 
analysis. The data analysis has been made at a descriptive level, and although providing some very 
interesting summaries of the Gallup World Poll and the implications on microfinance in sub-Saharan 
Africa, nonetheless few results are provided which contribute to filling the gap in the literature in this 
field. Aggarwal et al., supra note 94. 
255 Id. 
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the economic drawbacks of microfinance256 and provide evidence that 
suggests the promotion of methods for saving would be more efficient at 
reducing poverty in sub-Saharan Africa than loans: a result at odds with the 
research by Bauer et al.257 These authors find that borrower heterogeneity 
means that microfinance does not actually help to create new businesses on 
average, a result supported by Ahlin and Jiang.258 
A key theoretical paper on the topic of the long-term economic effects 
of microfinance has been published by Ahlin and Jiang in the Journal of 
Development Economics.259 However, these authors found that the key to 
long-term microfinance success is the “graduation rate.”260 The model 
analysis showed that microfinance “graduates” who achieve long-term 
benefits come as often from saving as from having business success. The 
implications of these findings are that the quality of microfinance loans 
needs to be increased through increasing the productive efficiency of self-
employed borrowers through information sharing, technological transfer, 
and training programs. Further, these authors suggest that MFI loan officer 
incentives and MFI evaluations be structured around the requirement for 
“graduation” of borrowers as well as outreach and social benefits.261 
Importantly, this theoretical discussion highlighted the interconnectedness 
between microfinance, microsavings, and long-term poverty reduction. 
d. Micro-Entrepreneurship 
The theoretical economic success of microfinance lies in its ability to 
mobilise the household savings of the poor to provide loans for 
entrepreneurs to start or grow small businesses.262 However, some authors 
                                                                                                                           
 
256 Drawbacks of microfinance include a credit-based poverty trap, over-indebtedness, and the 
crowding out of other anti-poverty interventions. 
257 See, e.g., Buera et al., supra note 17. 
258 Ahlin & Jiang, supra note 16, at 1. 
259 Id. These authors sought to use the Occupational Choice model to examine these effects based 
on the idea that access to credit allows some people to start businesses who previously had to subsist or 
rely on wages. Thus, microfinance can potentially reduce subsistence payoffs and reduce long term 
inequality and poverty. 
260 That is, entrepreneurs who then start fully fledged firms and access the formal financial 
system. 
261 Ahlin & Jiang, supra note 16. 
262 Buera et al., supra note 17. 
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have commented that micro-entrepreneurship is not part of the global 
economy, nor of national or international trade statistics.263 The 
implications of this have been described against the “rising tide lifts all 
boats” strategy of globalisation and the economic statistical influences of 
microfinance.264 However, research by Ahlin and Jiang does consider the 
importance, indeed, the critical nature of the graduation of microfinance 
borrowers to full-scale firms on the long-term economic effect of 
microfinance.265 
An important consideration in micro-entrepreneurship is the 
heterogeneity of borrowers. This means that simply providing access to 
credit does not necessarily create entrepreneurs.266 Indeed, this is a logical 
consideration and needs to be remembered when resting the economic 
development dreams on the shoulders of microfinance. 
The heterogeneity of borrower characteristics is also a subject of study 
in itself in that it affects the people who undertake microfinance and 
subsequently how the funds are used. A study published in the International 
Journal of Economics and Finance by Parvin, Rahman, and Jia267 examined 
the factors which influenced entrepreneurship of women in rural 
Bangladesh.268 Despite the qualitative data collection and other 
methodological considerations, the results of this study does provide some 
detail into the factors which influence female micro-entrepreneurship and 
should be considered. In particular, this study found that women participate 
                                                                                                                           
 
263 Arch, supra note 16. 
264 Id. 
265 Ahlin & Jiang, supra note 16. Despite these theoretical issues, most empirical works on the 
economic effect of microfinance have not considered the effect of micro-entrepreneurship occurring at a 
level too small to be included in cross-country statistics, and this provides a consideration when 
analysing the quality of empirical papers in this field. 
266 Aggarwal et al., supra note 94. 
267 Lovely Parvin et al., Determinates of Women Micro-entrepreneurship Development: An 
Empirical Investigation in Rural Bangladesh, 4 INT’L J. ECON. FIN. 254 (2012). 
268 Id. These authors collected data from 248 entrepreneurs and 132 non-entrepreneurs regarding 
their personal attributes, family situation, and environment. The study used a sampling method which 
seems to entail using all the possible entrepreneurs in a particular village in rural northern Bangladesh 
and a convenience sample to identify non-entrepreneurs. An interview schedule was applied to each 
participant and it is presumed that the responses were coded to allow for quantitative statistical analysis. 
The authors used a probit model to explain the impact of these explanatory variables on the probability 
of doing micro-entrepreneurship, and the model seems sound given that it was also used by other 
authors such as Roodman and Morduch. 
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in micro-enterprises because they want freedom of work and an increase in 
social status.269 Importantly, the research found that families in financial 
hardship are more likely to undertake microfinance.270 
An empirical paper on the impact of microfinance on entrepreneurship 
and social benefits has been undertaken by Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, 
and Kinnan and published as a working paper with the Bureau for Research 
and Economic Analysis of Development.271 These authors found that the 
establishment of an MFI in a new market resulted in an increase in 50% of 
borrowers in that area, and access to the MFI was used to borrow, invest, 
and create and expand businesses.272 Further, these authors found household 
differences in the effect of microfinance, and those with the propensity to 
start businesses reduced the consumption of food and temptation goods, 
whereas those with lower propensity to start businesses increased food 
consumption as a result of their access to microfinance.273 These authors 
comment that this household discrepancy means that the long-term effect of 
microfinance is difficult to assess because some households may actually 
get poorer, though they eat more, while others get richer, while eating less, 
as a result of access to credit.274 These authors also found that microfinance 
shows no effect on education, health, or female empowerment.275 




271 This key empirical paper provides experimental evidence from the implementation of 
randomised MFI establishment in certain “bastis,” or neighbourhoods, in Hyderabad. These researchers 
partnered with Spandana, a large and growing MFI which is primarily similar to the Grameen model of 
microfinance loans, but it does not provide business or financial literacy training. Spanada identified 120 
areas and 2,800 households completed a baseline survey in 2005 before the randomised establishment of 
MFI branch’s in 2006–2007. The baseline survey, while not being implemented randomly, did allow the 
researchers to track the control and experimental groups for changes as a result of microfinance being 
made available. This experimental model, while not being perfect, does allow for widely generalized 
results on the effect of microfinance. Abhijit Banerjee et al., The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence 
from a Randomized Evaluation, NBER Working Paper No. 18950, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (May 
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3. Social Benefits of Microfinance 
From a social perspective, microfinance has been relatively successful, 
with much of the previous research indicating an increase in empowerment 
of borrowers and increased access to finance, especially for female 
borrowers.276 Although the research confirming the qualitative success of 
microfinance is not unequivocal, varying research methods and countries 
may indicate that results are not directly comparable and this may explain 
the discrepancy. It is the social equality and fairness aspect of political 
goals which continue to motivate governments to support microfinance, 
both in and out of the developing world.277 Considering that the political 
goals are primarily social, it can be extended to conclude that the analysis 
of whether microfinance is a success or failure should be limited to social 
benefits. From this perspective, microfinance has achieved success 
benchmarks, in particular when related to social mobility.278 
a. Social Mobility 
The social mobility of people generally refers to the movement in 
social standing as a result of changes in income.279 It is a widely discussed 
goal of microfinance to increase social mobility of borrowers because of the 
resulting health and educational benefits from increases in income and 
social standing.280 An empirical study by Hamdani and Naeem found that 
microfinance results in an increase in social mobility and living standards 
as well as providing financial opportunities.281 The results of this study 
allowed these authors to conclude that microfinance is a key strategy for 
quick economic revival, an increase in living standards, empowerment, and 
                                                                                                                           
 
276 See, e.g., Mayoux, supra note 221. 
277 See, e.g., John M. Trussel & Linda M. Parsons, Financial Reporting Factors Affecting 
Donations to Charitable Not-for-Profit Organizations, 32 ADVANCES IN ACCT. 263 (2007). 
278 See supra Part III. 
279 Syed Muhammad Qasim Hamdani & Hummayoun Naeem, The Impact of Microfinance on 
Social Mobility, an Empirical Evidence from Pakistan, 3 INTERDISC. J. CONTEMP. RES. BUS. 81 (2012). 
280 Id. 
281 Id. The sampling of the borrowers examined in the study was not reliably shown to be 
representatively applied the social mobility scale to 350 microfinance customers of three leading MFIs 
in Rawalpindi and Islamabad in Pakistan. 
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social mobility.282 Although social mobility is a key desired result from 
microfinance, empirical studies focussing on this independent variable are 
limited and there is potential scope for future research on this aspect of 
microfinance social effects. 
b. Intergenerational Effects 
The effect of microfinance on intergenerational reductions in poverty 
are intuitive in that families with more successful businesses are more 
financially able to send their children to school, and higher education 
provides the children and subsequent generations with better potential long-
term financial outcomes. However, this does not account for the potential 
that children provide a cheap source of labour for a growing family 
business. An influential study by Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart, and 
Meghir as a working paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research 
has analysed exactly this paradox to determine the impact that microcredit 
has on intergenerational poverty reduction, child and teenage labour and 
education.283 
The study examined the effect of microcredit on child and teenage 
labour and education in order to determine the intergenerational effects of 
microcredit.284 The key findings of this study are that microcredit results in 
lower education and a higher labour supply of teenagers to family 
                                                                                                                           
 
282 Id. 
283 Britta Augsburg et al., The Impacts of Microcredit: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
18538 NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (2012). Augsburg et al. used a Randomised Controlled Trial 
methodology to randomly provide credit to 1,198 borderline applicants previously refused microfinance 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This experimental design allowed the authors to isolate the direct effects of 
microfinance on the variables of interest as half of the participants received credit and half did not, but 
both groups were monitored over a 14 month period. However, the potential population sample of this 
study comprised only those borderline applicants who were rejected, so the sample may not be 
representative of microfinance in general. The selection of participants for this study was a critical 
component of the experimental methodology as they were able to identify participants who thought they 
had a viable business opportunity and were on the borderline of being accepted. However, as the 
participants were refused microcredit by the bank previously, demographic trends were found to be 
different than to the existing group of borrowers within the microcredit institution. In particular, the 
participants of the study were slightly poorer and more disadvantaged than regular borrowers. However, 
consistent interest rates were charged 22% compared with 21% to regular borrowers and the average 
loan was the equivalent of $1,012 over an average maturity of 57 weeks. 
284 Id. 
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businesses between 16 and 19 years old.285 These authors found that 
microcredit does not lead to an increase in profits or an increase in 
household income over the observation period. However, being provided 
with microcredit does increase business activity in that there are increases 
in business ownership and reductions in the purchase of temptation 
goods.286 The study also found evidence that the microcredit loans are too 
small to start or expand a business, in that borrowers either ran down 
savings287 or decreased consumption288 over the period to compensate. 
Although 77% of the borrowers offered collateral for the loans, the result of 
this was adverse selection as evidenced by erratic repayment by those who 
offered collateral. 
The study by Augsburg et al. highlights that the intergenerational 
effects of microfinance may in fact be the contrary to those often promoted 
by microfinance advocates. Specifically, this research found that increases 
in parental wealth do not necessarily result in higher childhood education, 
especially for females, and that instead, this is effectively an 
intergenerational transfer of wealth from children to parents.289 There may 
alternatively be more efficient tools at alleviating long-term poverty. The 
authors propose a combination of microfinance and Conditional Cash 
Transfer (CCT) to overcome the effective competition between business 
activity and schooling which is currently underpinned by microcredit. 
However, these innovations cross the line between treating borrowers as 
valued members of the financial system and charity recipients with 
conditions for doing what external people impose as beneficial. 
D. Financial Sustainability 
There is a theoretical trade-off between MFI financial sustainability 
and financial access to the poor. Hence, for the purposes of this article, 
microfinance success includes MFIs which are financially self-sustainable. 
Financial self-sustainability is when MFIs are able to internally fund their 
                                                                                                                           
 
285 Id. This is because internal labour is cheap (potentially free compared to hired labour), 




289 Id. This is the opposite of what microfinance is designed to achieve. 
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operations through revenue reliance on donations or low-interest loans from 
government. Financial sustainability can be described as an economic 
model of the relationship between the funding source, transaction costs, and 
profit with outreach to target borrowers. There is a theoretical balance 
between regulation and the sustainability of MFIs. This is because the 
regulation of MFIs has the potential to affect the sourcing of credit on 
international markets and the business operations such as product design.290 
Financial sustainability is achieved if the MFI outreach and functioning 
occurs in isolation from the whims of donors or credit providers. Regulation 
can do this by allowing access to funding sources such as savings (because, 
generally, only banks can accept deposits),291 international investment 
funds, and credit market access. With proper regulation and monitoring, 
these sources of capital are able to flow towards MFIs as well as equity 
partnerships.292 
If MFIs are not financially stable or otherwise unable to access these 
sources of sustainable capital to lend to microfinance borrowers, they must 
primarily rely on other funding sources, either from NGO’s or subsidised 
credit from governments. The result of this is that although the social 
benefits from microfinance may continue to be reached, the continuation of 
these benefits relies on a cycle of charitably motivated funding. Authors 
have found that although the microfinance industry is transforming, funding 
is not.293 A financial model which relies on donor funding when a self-
sustaining model is available may put MFIs under unnecessary risk. This is 
because if MFIs are reliant on donor or subsidised funding and if there is a 
change in the financial stability or focus of their sponsors, MFIs may be left 
without funding.294 However, it is the legislation of MFIs which potentially 
influences whether they are regulated to a financially stable level where 
they can receive deposits and also whether international and credit market 
funding sources are available. 
                                                                                                                           
 
290 INT’L MONETARY FUND, Rural and Microfinance Institutions: Regulatory and Supervisory 
Issues, in FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT: A HANDBOOK, 187 (2005), available at https://www.imf 
.org/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/pdf/ch07.pdf. 
291 Satta, supra note 42. 
292 Di Bella, supra note 50, at 32. 
293 Al-Azzam et al., supra note 12, at 62. 
294 Josephat Mboya Kiweu, Relaxing Financing Constraint in the Microfinance Industry: Is 
Commercialization the Answer?, 9 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 87 (2011). 
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In determining the performance of microfinance institutions, authors 
have considered the trade-off between sustainability and outreach. Ferro 
Luzzi and Weber examined the measurement of MFI performance.295 The 
results of the analysis by Ferro Luzzi and Weber show that the efficient use 
of capital by small-scale entrepreneurs leads to potentially high returns and 
thus a willingness to pay relatively high interest rates.296 Based on their 
findings, these authors comment that in order for MFIs to complete the 
market they either focus on increasing outreach to the poor or on financial 
viability, and rarely both simultaneously. This article is particularly 
important for the current research because it provides a unique way of 
analysing MFI performance in a multi-dimensional context, something 
which has not been done in other papers.297 Despite these issues, the paper 
by Ferro Luzzi and Weber has provided some key results, such as 
illustrating the potential negative effect of interest rate ceilings and the time 
required to grant a first loan on financial performance of MFIs.298 This 
research effectively found that there are a number of key factors critical for 
MFI performance and borrower outreach, which are often at odds with each 
other. An implication of these results is that there needs to be operational 
efficiency of MFIs which includes the monitoring of loan officers and 
                                                                                                                           
 
295 Giovanni Ferro Luzzi & Sylvian Weber, Measuring the Performance of Microfinance 
Institutions (Centre de Recherche Appliquee en Gestion, Haute ecole de gestion de Geneve, Working 
Paper, 2006). These authors use data collected by the Graduate Institute of Development Studies of 
Geneva on 45 MFIs from 1999–2003, and utilised the particular variables of interest for the paper. In 
particular, the authors use loan size as a proxy for depth of outreach in that small average loan sizes 
reflect that MFIs reach the very poor. Further, the percentage of female borrowers is also a proxy for 
depth of outreach because loans to women are apparently more highly valued by society. In addition, the 
range of financial services provided by MFIs affects the scope of outreach. The number of loan officers 
per branch is deemed to affect both breadth and scope of outreach. These authors further theoretically 
extend that lending to groups reflects outreach to the poor. These factors of analysis can be combined to 
determine how oriented to serving the poor the MFI actually is. Using this data, these authors exploited 
the different dimensions of MFI performance to conduct factor analysis, which identifies separate 
influences on sustainability and outreach individually without requiring pre-determinants. 
296 Id. at 15. 
297 Id. at 15–16. However, while the results of the paper do provide an indication of the most 
important aspects of financial performance of MFIs, the effect of country-specific macroeconomic and 
institutional conditions caused the clusters, generated under cluster analysis, to be somewhat undefined. 
This, in combination with the methodological issues of factor analysis, in not being able to determine 
absolute effects, means that the results of this study are indicative of outreach and performance aspects 
but not statistically definitive. 
298 Id. at 15. 
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potentially performance based bonuses or a similar system as supported by 
Jiwani.299 
Empirical studies have built on the results found by Ferro Luzzi and 
Weber and focused specifically on the effect of regulation on MFI 
performance.300 A particularly prominent study on this topic has been 
published in Applied Economics by Hartarska and Nadolnyak.301 This 
research found that the capital ratio affects financial performance.302 That is 
to say that MFIs which are better capitalised have higher financial 
sustainability. Further, age and size also positively impact MFI 
sustainability, potentially because of the resulting impact on funding 
sources. Hartarska and Nadolnyak found that having access to more 
funding sources resulted in higher financial sustainability, while having 
access to more savings resulted in greater outreach as measured by the 
number of borrowers.303 The potential implication of this is that prudential 
regulation directly concerning MFIs304 has the ability to increase the 
amount of savings held by MFIs and this can affect outreach.305 Thus, there 
are indirect benefits of regulation in that increases in savings in MFIs 
results in greater outreach and access to credit. 
Following the trend of the area of interest followed by Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak and Ferro Luzzi and Weber, a paper by Haq, Skully, and Pathan 
examines the cost efficiency of MFIs.306 Haq et al. found that although in 
                                                                                                                           
 
299 See, e.g., Jay Jiwani, Sustainable Microfinance: The Impact of pay for performance on Key 
performance Indicators (Apr. 27, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Argosy University—Chicago). 
300 See Luzzi & Weber, supra note 295. 
301 Hartarska & Nadolnyak, supra note 190. These authors used panel data which allowed them to 
determine if fixed or random effects were the most appropriate methodological perspective. In 
examining the data for 114 MFIs in 62 countries, these authors found that MFIs are less leveraged than 
banks and yet 38% of MFIs do not collect savings to supplement the reduced access to capital from 
external sources. 
302 Id. at 1215 (examining performance as a function of bank-specific variables, macroeconomic 
conditions, institutions, and the regulatory framework). 
303 Id. at 1220. 
304 In terms of microfinance, prudential regulation refers to the licencing and regulation of formal 
MFIs for ongoing activities. 
305 Outreach is a previously defined political goal from the preceding papers. 
306 Mamiza Haq et al., Efficiency of Microfinance Institutions: A Data Envelopment Analysis, 17 
Asia-Pac. Fin. Markets 63 (2010) (Using data from the Mix Market Exchange on 39 MFIs in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, these authors used a non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis, a piece-wise 
linear combination that connects the best practice observations and forms a convex productions set of 
possibilities. This methodology is especially useful to apply to non-profit organisations where high 
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the short-term NGO-run MFIs were the most efficient, in the long-term it 
was possible for bank-MFIs to be the most efficient.307 
Bauer and Gaskell developed two models to examine MFI cost 
efficiency and found that efficient MFIs have greater outreach308 and higher 
operational sustainability.309 Interestingly, these authors identified the 
Ethiopian Bank-MFI “DECSI” as the most technically efficient. It was 
found that NGO-MFIs have the highest overall mean efficiency, which 
indicates that the regulation affecting these institutions may be the most 
relatively supportive. In terms of operating efficiencies, it was found that 
cost efficient managers are better at managing customers and monitoring 
operational costs. Further, an implication for the size of MFIs is that 
efficiency is achieved from efficiently using resources, not simply from the 
scale of production. This is despite the fact that larger MFIs have greater 
performance. However, to the contrary, this result may also indicate that 
any attempt to regulate MFIs leads to inefficiency because NGO’s are 
usually outside of regulation. 
Despite the study of the financial performance of MFIs being limited 
to the data voluntarily provided to such companies as Mix Market 
Exchange, a number of studies have empirically examined the relationship 
between financial sustainability and performance and outreach. A key 
empirical World Bank study by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 
systematically studied the financial performance and outreach of 124 MFIs 
in 49 countries.310 These authors found that screening and monitoring in 
group lending overcomes the issues of moral hazard and asymmetric 
information.311 The evidence for this finding is that as the interest rate 
increases, there is a reduction in the portfolio quality in individual loans but 
not for group loans. 
                                                                                                                           
 
profit and low cost are not vital. The relevance of this technique for the analysis of the sample selected 
is that the researchers do not need price information and they can work with a small sample size.). 
307 Id. 
308 These are output-oriented MFIs. 
309 These are input-oriented MFIs. 
310 Cull et al., supra note 203. 
311 Id. at 5–6. These authors made a distinction between the three main type of MFIs (individual-
based, solidarity group lenders, and village banks) and examined if profitability leads to lower outreach 
as a result of “mission drift,” which is deliberately serving the wealthier and more profitable clients. 
These authors commented on the trend towards individual loans in large MFIs such as the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh and BancoSol in Bolivia, as individual loans are assumed to be more flexible. 
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In a summary of the empirical research on microfinance, Hermes and 
Lensink examined the trade-off between financial performance and 
outreach.312 These authors discussed how joint lending reduces asymmetric 
information because it provides incentives to the group to screen, monitor, 
and enforce repayment.313 This effectively reduces the agency costs of the 
lender. Given that the poor are excluded from the financial system because 
of the cost to the bank to screen, monitor, and enforce contracts, along with 
a lack of collateral, this provides the microfinance innovation. 
In determining the performance of MFIs, the outreach314 to borrowers 
is often used as a benchmark. This study determined that outreach equates 
to reaching more borrowers.315 This benchmark in itself is problematic 
because a focus on quantity rather than quality is rarely a good strategy 
when the well-being of the poor is a documented outcome. The direct 
influences on outreach to borrowers have been studied by Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak in a paper which aims to determine the effect of regulation on 
MFI performance.316 
Nonetheless, this paper followed an empirical methodology and 
determined that MFIs with more funding sources have more savings, and 
that more savings deposits results in higher levels of outreach. Further, 
prudential regulation has been found to directly increase the savings held by 
MFIs. As an indirect conclusion, these authors also found that economic 
freedom and property rights security did not affect MFI sustainability but 
did increase outreach to borrowers. The results of this study indicate that 
outreach is an established goal of microfinance and that regulation has the 
ability to directly affect it via deposit rates.317 
Banks require capital in order to provide loans to borrowers, to finance 
operational costs, and fund expansion. The operations of MFIs are no 
                                                                                                                           
 
312 Hermes & Lensink, supra note 4, at F1. 
313 Id. at 2. 
314 For the purposes of this paper, outreach is defined as the number of borrowers reached by 
microfinance services. 
315 Hartarska & Nadolnyak, supra note 190, at 1212. 
316 Id. This study examined 114 MFIs from 62 countries using data from Mix Information 
Exchange. These authors determined performance as a function of bank specific variables, 
macroeconomic conditions, institutional design, and the regulatory framework. This particular study by 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak documented a variety of important results for the regulation of MFIs, 
discussed in subsequent sections of this paper. 
317 Id. 
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different in a general sense regarding the sources from which they obtain 
capital and at what cost.318 Traditionally, MFIs have been financed by 
donor capital from NGO’s and western governments.319 However, there has 
also been a trend in recent decades for MFIs to obtain finance from private 
investors who purchase shares as investments or from domestic and 
international capital markets.320 The recent trend in changes in the sources 
of capital MFIs use is motivated by the increased consideration of MFI 
financial sustainability, as discussed in the previous Parts. The relationship 
between the regulation of MFIs and their performance as measured by 
financial sustainability and outreach is an area of research closely aligned 
with the topic of the current article. However, the current article is primarily 
concerned with considering how different approaches to microfinance 
regulation may be better suited to stimulating the initiative, considering the 
range of social and economic issues discussed up until this point. Thus, the 
following Part considers CSR and facilitative regulation as potential 
strategies for governments to consider. 
V. CSR AND FACILITATIVE REGULATION 
Microfinance has challenges to overcome in achieving political goals. 
There are financial sustainability barriers as well as cultural issues which 
may lead to the lower awareness and lower than expected microfinance 
economic success. It may be that regulation can assist in the promotion of 
MFIs in increasing credit access to the poor. If regulation may assist 
microfinance there are three main types of regulation to be discussed. The 
regulation may fall under self-regulation CSR, facilitative regulation, or 
direct regulation. The current and next Parts of this article will discuss 
regulation opportunities in the context of microfinance. These Parts aim to 
identify whether legislation can theoretically solve the market problems, 
which were identified previously in this article. These discussions will 
identify the different types of regulation in terms of a tiered approach to 
microfinance promotion in that the ideal first step is CSR. If CSR fails, 
facilitative legislation may be implemented. If facilitative legislation fails, 
                                                                                                                           
 
318 See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2. 
319 Di Bella, supra note 50, at 3. 
320 Block, supra note 100, at 63–64. 
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direct legislation may be required. Thus, the three approaches to regulation 
work together to achieve the desired outcome, complementing each other to 
achieve political goals. 
A. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has potentially direct and 
strong impacts on microfinance promotion all over the world through such 
initiatives as “green finance” where banks in developed countries provide 
low interest loans directly to MFIs. CSR types of programs are supported 
by most large financial institutions and organisations all over the world 
with the aim of contributing to society as well as being profitable. This kind 
of program is sometimes referred to as the “triple bottom line,” where 
companies measure and report the social and environmental outcomes as 
well as financial. These programs are social initiatives designed by, 
financed, and implemented by organisations all over the world with the aim 
of increasing employee morale and reputation in the market. 
Many CSR programs are employee driven, or act as an incentive when 
attracting employee talent in that people are more likely to work for an 
organisation which not only makes profit, but also supports some social 
objectives and programs.321 Research is ambiguous regarding the 
relationship between CSR programs and financial performance with studies 
showing that either there is a relationship, is not, or it is unclear.322 
In essence, CSR programs are self-regulation where institutions design 
programs to achieve political social and economic goals. In some developed 
and developing countries there is legislation which supports CSR programs, 
which can in turn benefit microfinance if that is the avenue of financial 
support. CSR programs can operate either in developed or developing 
countries. Further, CSR programs may entail green finance operated 
                                                                                                                           
 
321 Ramin Gamerschlag et al., Determinants of Voluntary CSR Disclosure: Empirical Evidence 
from Germany, 5 REV. MANAGERIAL SCI. 234 (2010). 
322 See, e.g., Leonardo Becchetti, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Performance: 
Evidence from a Panel of U.S. Listed Companies (Centre for Int’l Studies on Econ. Growth, Working 
Paper No. 78, Dec. 2005); JOSHUA D. MARGOLIS & JAMES P. WALSH, PEOPLE AND PROFITS? THE 
SEARCH FOR A LINK BETWEEN A COMPANY’S SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (2001); Abagail 
McWilliams, Donald S. Siegel & Patrick M. Wright, Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic 
Implications, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1 (2006). 
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directly by the institution or the funding of development programs or 
microfinance programs which indirectly achieve the individual CSR goals 
of the organisation. This is especially relevant considering that many CSR 
programs support microfinance.323 If MFIs are able to operate in a 
financially sustainable way, it is possible for CSR to contribute to support 
MFI expansionary programs or through knowledge transfers rather than 
simply donations. 
1. Can Regulation Stimulate Microfinance via CSR? 
The legislation of developed countries can stimulate or support CSR 
directly via taxation incentives. Given that a body of funds come from 
developed country CSR programs, the stimulation directed regulation here 
may have a wider social effect than the regulation of developing countries. 
In Australia, donations to registered charities are tax deductible, and with 
corporate tax rates fixed at 30% this effectively results in a 30% discount to 
corporations for donations.324 The inclusion of donations in the expenses, 
which can be claimed as tax deductible, allows CSR programs to justify the 
cost of their programs to budgetary deciders within each organisation. In 
order to directly stimulate microfinance via CSR programs, it may be 
possible for tax incentives or rebates to be higher for costs and knowledge 
transfers associated with microfinance. However, this strategy would need 
to be built on a foundation of studies on the efficiency of microfinance at 
achieving political goals, of which this study is not one. This study is 
concerned with the legal institutions which can promote financial inclusion 
through financially self-sustainable MFIs. 
The legislation of developing countries can indirectly support CSR 
programs by strengthening the market conditions in which CSR funded 
initiatives operate and by reducing corruption.325 Arguably, environments 
which have a more effective use of resources and fewer concerns about 
corruption, may attract more consistent CSR program funding. In addition, 
                                                                                                                           
 
323 See generally Microfinance, ING, http://www.ingforsomethingbetter.com/initiatives/ 
microfinance. 
324 N.S.W. Dep’t of Trade & Inv., Corporate Tax Rates (2013), http://business.nsw.gov.au/invest-
in-nsw/about-nsw/economic-and-business-climate/corporate-tax-rates. 
325 Di Bella, supra note 50, at n.16. 
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many international banks have subsidiaries in developing countries and 
legislation may be able to support these locally regulated and taxed 
organisations in achieving social objectives. The tax incentives for 
microfinance CSR programs, which are an opportunity, may also be 
effective in developing countries with financially independent subsidiaries. 
2. Credit Database and Disclosure 
There are a variety of initiatives which regulators can implement to 
promote microfinance. However, many are seen as being overly 
burdensome to implement or monitor. Some initiatives such as a credit 
database and disclosure regulation has the potential to promote 
microfinance in a “softly, softly” manner which does not have many 
potential disadvantages, but has many potential benefits. In an OECD 
working paper, Herd et al. analyse the financial reforms of India and 
develop recommendations for microfinance regulation to promote 
microfinance.326 The authors based an analysis on the law of microfinance 
in India with the aim of avoiding the consequences such as were seen in 
Andhra Pradesh in 2010 with interest rate caps introduced by the state 
parliament. The paper established the situation of microfinance in India in 
2010, and theoretically discussed the effect of financial sector reforms on 
financial sector efficiency and the spill-over effects on the rest of the 
economy. In particular it was found that 13 out of 14 of India’s largest 
MFIs were regulated as non-bank financial companies and were not 
allowed to take deposits. The result of this is, understandably, that there is 
lower microfinance penetration.327 
The legal analysis conducted by Herd et al. focussed on future Indian 
financial reforms.328 This paper suggested that the government can do 
things to reduce the risk of over-borrowing other than caps on interest rates, 
such as a credit database. Further, these authors suggested that personal 
bankruptcy laws be developed to complement the credit database. These 
two suggestions for regulation affect microfinance directly by supporting 
                                                                                                                           
 
326 Herd et al., supra note 75. 
327 Hartarska & Nadolnyak, supra note 190, at n.2. 
328 Herd et al., supra note 75, at 2. 
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borrowers and providing fewer transaction costs than other legislative 
reform in this area. 
3. Green Finance 
Operational challenges of microfinance rely on the sourcing of capital 
to on-lend to borrowers and fund business operations. One source of 
finance is through green finance, which are wholesale loans provided by 
large banks to MFIs. One example of green finance is ING’s subsidiary, 
ING Vysya, and the Green Finance department which together provide 
more than €70 million in wholesale loans to MFIs in more than eight 
countries.329 
Banks have incentives to do this kind of CSR program not only for 
marketing content in developed countries, but also because of tax incentives 
in many countries for charity expenses, as discussed previously. It is 
possible that the reputational benefits from green finance CSR programs are 
enough to stimulate MFIs without the need for direct regulation. 
4. Implications of CSR 
The key benefit of CSR microfinance programs is cost effectiveness in 
terms of allocating funds to MFIs without taking resources from the 
governments of developing countries, nor from NGO’s. In essence, this is a 
Pareto improvement in the amount of funds available for microfinance in 
developing countries. However, it does, of course, bring further issues 
forward in the discussion of the “North-South” debate and whether Western 
consultants are indeed the best allocators of funds to MFIs. An additional 
benefit is that CSR programs allow direct MFI support which bypasses 
some avenues of domestic corruption which plagues many developing 
countries.330 Further, CSR microfinance initiatives are designed and 
implemented by organisations with teams of qualified and experienced 
                                                                                                                           
 
329 ING, ING Group Corporate Social Responsibility Report: Performance Report 2007, at 18, 
http://www.ing.com/web/file?uuid-f825bd49-348a-48d0-843e-c8a7860185db&owner=b03bc017-e0db-
4b5d-abbf-003b12934429&contentid=6465. 
330 See Eduardo Buscaglia, On Best and Not So Good Practices for Addressing High-Level 
Corruption Worldwide: An Empirical Assessment, INT’L HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORRUPTION 453 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Soreide eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
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consultants who are able to use transferable skills to ensure operating 
efficiency in allocating the funds to each source. Those in developing 
countries may be capable of efficiently designing and implementing CSR 
programs, but using resources from developed countries means that the 
developing country resources are not diverted. 
The imposition of microfinance charity externally through CSR 
programs has the potential to completely miss the target aims of 
microfinance. This is because it is not possible for executives in developed 
countries to be able to understand exactly what is needed in developing 
countries to stimulate microfinance and achieve the subsequent political 
goals.331 Although CSR programs may consult with local operators and 
advisers, there may still be an air of the imposition of ethical ideas in a “we 
know what is best for you” colonial sense. In light of this disadvantage, it is 
understandable that CSR programs invest heavily in knowledge of their 
programs before allocating funds,332 although the extent of this presents a 
trade-off between using capital which could otherwise be allocated to 
microfinance and ensuring that the money serves the desired goals. An 
example of this is the failure to address both capital constraints and human 
capital constraints. Entrepreneurship development programs have often 
failed to create entrepreneurs out of the poor they give to, when inadequate 
training results in the “income generating assets,” such as egg-laying 
chickens becoming this evening’s dinner. In light of this trend of 
disadvantages, the impact of CSR programs may be less than what would 
otherwise be expected. However, the Pareto benefits from CSR supporting 
legislation in developed and developing countries provides adequate 
motivations for support. 
B. Facilitative Regulation 
Thus, facilitative legislation such as tax concessions can stimulate 
organisations to self-regulate through CSR programs to benefit 
microfinance. However, in the case of microfinance, there are advantages 
                                                                                                                           
 
331 Tammy D. Allen et al., The Mentor’s Perspective: A Qualitative Inquiry and Future Research 
Agenda, 51 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAVIOR 70 (1997). 
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and disadvantages of each type of regulation, and these indicate that the 
implementation of regulation may need to be across the different types, and 
tailored to each specific country. 
1. State Guarantee 
State guarantees of deposits are a technique recently used in many 
developed countries to prevent bank runs during the GFC. State guarantees 
of deposits have the potential to increase the financial sustainability of 
MFIs by providing for a source of capital which comes from the local 
population of MFI branches. State guarantees of deposits move the reliance 
of trust from the depositor on the MFI to the government, which may have 
the result of increasing deposits. State guarantees are also applicable to 
microfinance loans in order to reduce the risk to banks for providing 
microfinance loans. The state guarantee of microfinance loans is effectively 
a replacement for collateral. Although there are already repayments of 99% 
on microfinance loans,333 perceived risk of microfinance loans by banks 
may not equate to this reality. In theory, state guarantees of microfinance 
loan amounts provide incentives for banks to lend money to microfinance 
borrowers so long as transaction costs can be covered, as the risk of default 
is not borne by the bank, but by the government instead. However, at this 
stage almost all microfinance is provided by specialised MFIs. 
In practice, this theory does not account for the high transaction costs 
associated with providing and monitoring each microfinance loan. An 
important disadvantage of state guarantees are potential mass defaults on 
loans which can destabilise the credibility of microfinance, and also the 
financial sustainability of MFIs while they apply for their losses to be 
recouped from the state. In effect, the state guarantees of microfinance 
loans may potentially result in harm to the microfinance sector. As with all 
potential results, this depends on the specific country in question and 
especially the loan culture and levels of trust and cultural capital. 
Thus, the state guarantee of microsavings and microfinance loans is 
unlikely to have large negative consequences on the social and 
developmental outcomes of the poor, although it is unlikely in itself to have 
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a large impact on the success of microfinance, and the sustainability of 
MFIs. 
2. Innovation 
The potential for microfinance to be developed within a country by 
building on existing infrastructure has promising outcomes across the 
world, especially in the case of building on existing mobile phone uptake. 
In an OECD working paper, Herd et al. examined the financial reform in 
India and considered the various ways mobile phones can be utilised in 
increasing financial inclusion.334 These authors discuss the additive model 
where there is a new interface for existing customers, and the 
transformational model where the telecommunications company provides a 
money transfer system through their own network, with local agents who 
give and receive cash. The additive model is the path that has been chosen 
by the RBI for India. However, these authors suggest that the government 
can facilitate this technological innovation by reducing the “Know Your 
Client” regulation for banking services under a certain account balance. 
This is especially prudent considering that India does not have a national 
requirement for identity cards. The paper supports the potential impact of 
this legislative change by illustrating the penetration of mobile phone based 
financial services in Kenya, a country which has bank density of one third 
that of India and yet financial system inclusion much higher proportionally, 
also considering the relatively similar mobile phone penetration rates of the 
two countries. The potential scope for microfinance penetration through 
innovation is large and requires complementary legislation to achieve the 
goal. 
The OECD working paper by Herd et al., while focussing on potential 
financial reform for India, suggests that the model of financial system 
inclusion via mobile phones be developed.335 In order for financial services 
to be provided via mobile technology, regulation needs to support less 
stringent requirements to establish a financial relationship. For example, 
regulation changes in Pakistan to mobile banking rules have resulted in 
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large increases in financial system access.336 The potential scope for 
microfinance penetration through innovation is large and requires 
complementary legislation to achieve the goal. 
3. Support of Microsavings Products by MFIs 
Microfinance is a financial innovation which has resulted in creative 
thinking to develop strategies for increasing financial inclusion to the poor. 
Authors have discussed that if the poor can borrow their way out of 
poverty, they can just as surely save their way out of it.337 Microsavings 
theoretically does all the things that credit does, but without the interest rate 
and inflexible loan amounts and repayment schedules. Specifically, savings 
can allow for precautionary savings and provide an amount for starting a 
business.338 Further, savings puts the poor under no burden of debt and is 
not a resources diversion from other avenues of donor support.339 With no 
other options available, it is better than cash hidden under a mattress. 
It is possible for the government to provide regulation which supports 
the establishment and sustainability of MFIs. This potential facilitative 
regulation option would theoretically work alongside a government 
guarantee of microdeposits. This is because people are already somewhat 
untrusting of MFIs, so it can be imagined that trusting small organisations 
with savings is even less likely than the lending of money.340 A government 
guarantee can potentially increase the level of trust and the use of 
microsavings, but this also creates a potential moral hazard situation. The 
potential market for regulated and state guaranteed microsavings 
institutions is reinforced by the current use of savings accounts by the poor 
which are suboptimal in that they are costly and present some risk to the 
depositor. Many savings accounts currently used and active in Africa have 
no interest and charge a withdrawal fee, yet are still in use.341 
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“If the poor can borrow their way out of poverty then they can equally 
well save their way out of it.”342 In a World Bank working paper, Aggarwal 
et al. present a line of analysis and argument for the support of 
microsavings programs in sub-Saharan Africa. These authors found that 
trust is critical for financial behaviour and that it is closely related to the 
problem of corrupt institutions. These authors also found that if there is low 
trust in the country, people do not borrow and they definitely do not 
deposit. Thus, the regulatory initiatives to provide support for savings may 
need to be much more encompassing of the whole financial system and 
country in general. That is, regulation which can promote microfinance may 
need to address the regulation of MFIs, however, the regulation which can 
promote savings may need to address systemic corruption and financial 
system security, among other things. 
However, despite these challenges, these authors develop theoretical 
arguments for microsavings as programs with high potential impact because 
savings do all the things that debt should do, but without the burden of debt 
or resource diversion. Further, Aggarwal et al. found that there is a large 
potential scope for microsavings in that people already use various savings 
methods which are expensive. These savings methods are costly because 
they often give no interest, charge a withdrawal fee, and are risky.343 Thus, 
innovation in microsavings can provide the poor with accounts to which 
they have access and which are dependable. The issue of microsavings and 
the support of such innovations are key to the consideration of microfinance 
because of the previously discussed potential role of savings in financially 
self-sustainable MFIs. 
4. Implications of Facilitative Regulation 
The main benefit of facilitative legislation such as tax concessions and 
state guarantees is that the overall cost to the government is small compared 
to the potential benefit from microfinance and other development 
initiatives. Indeed, tax concessions for charity spending or for the provision 
of green finance may result in some lost tax revenue. There are, however, 
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limited actual expenditures, which means the avenues for corruption are 
fewer than with cost-bearing initiatives.344 In addition, facilitative 
regulation may potentially allow the diversification of financial services 
provided by MFIs. 
Facilitative legislation provides incentives for large financial 
institutions to use their funds for supporting development and microfinance 
initiatives in developing countries. However, this legislation does not take 
any positive action towards specifically achieving the political goals 
discussed. Further, the actual cost of facilitative legislation is difficult to 
quantify because of the problem in isolating CSR investment, which is 
affected directly as a result of the tax concessions rather than through 
employee demands to management or a source for marketing content. In 
this way, the measurability issues of facilitative legislation mean that 
concrete discussions and empirical research about which facilitative 
legislation is most effective at stimulating microfinance are difficult to 
achieve. 
Another key disadvantage is that facilitative regulation provides 
incentives for funds to be invested in philanthropic causes but not into the 
particularly effective avenues for development over others. The result of 
this is that funds may be balanced between avenues such as microfinance 
with historical empowerment benefits, and other avenues which result in 
lower benefit to the developing country. Further, in the event of a large 
economic shock with state guarantees of microsavings and microloans, an 
already under-resourced government may be required to divert resources to 
MFIs, banks, and borrowers, rather than the chronic poor who are outside 
the financial system and are in more absolute need of immediate support 
during such crises. 
A key disadvantage of state guarantees of loans and deposits is that a 
large potential moral hazard may be created.345 That is, MFIs and banks 
may provide microfinance to those they know will not repay in order to 
collect the interest until they recoup the loan balance from the government. 
The costs and administrative burden of receiving the lost loan balance after 
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default of a microfinance borrower from the government may in fact 
outweigh the loan balance that will be returned, and this may create further 
problems than the actual incentives provided by this legislation. 
This Part has discussed CSR and facilitative law approaches which 
may facilitate microfinance to achieve established political goals. It can be 
seen that although CSR and soft law can potentially achieve the established 
goals, the systems are not perfect, and a combination of approaches is 
required. Thus, if soft law is not sufficient in all situations to achieve the 
goals of microfinance, it may be that direct regulation provides the 
framework required, and this will be discussed in the next Part. 
VI. DIRECT REGULATION 
Microfinance programs of CSR initiatives which are stimulated by 
facilitative legislation may not be enough to achieve the political goals 
which microfinance seeks to accomplish. If this is the case, direct 
regulation may be required. Direct regulation includes potential initiatives 
such as creating a maximum chargeable interest rate to microfinance 
borrowers or a minimum percentage of loans to microfinance out of the 
total loan portfolio for banks. Other options include the creation and 
management of government-owned MFIs. Direct regulation is a potential 
way to stimulate microfinance, however, some direct legislation can result 
in a regulatory failure by providing incentives which impact the distribution 
of resources in a manner which would not occur in an unregulated market. 
A. Why Is There Microfinance Law? 
Microfinance law has been implemented, as opposed to allowing MFIs 
to generally fall under banking law, in order to support the political goals of 
credit availability and distribution. However, the development of specific 
MFI law depends on each country and there is as yet no international 
framework from which developing countries can design their own 
regulations.346 Although, in essence, MFIs provide the same services as 
banks but on a smaller scale, the motivation behind the provision of these 
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services results in different risks to customers and different societal 
effects.347 Thus, the law which regulates a profit seeking bank must surely 
be different to the law regulating a non-profit MFI with socioeconomic 
objectives. 
It is logical that financial institutions which provide different products 
should be regulated differently. The fact that the objectives of microfinance 
are around credit availability to the poor and subsequent socioeconomic 
benefits, operational structures would naturally reflect this. In comparison, 
the profit motivated products and services of traditional banks would indeed 
be reflected by their operation. Although both entities may provide loans, 
insurance, pensions, and savings products, the motivation behind the 
operations and the subsequent effect on society require a different 
regulatory framework. Authors have commented that because of the scale 
of operations and products affected, the collapse of a single MFI is unlikely 
to have large consequences in an individual country.348 However, there are 
potentially life-changing effects on individual members of the poorest in 
society if they were to lose their microsavings. Thus, regulation is 
especially important for situations where the poor can potentially be worse 
off. This does not mean that no regulation at all is needed, it simply 
highlights that different regulation is necessary if the socioeconomic goals 
of microfinance are to be achieved. 
The regulation of MFIs often covers only some of the products 
offered, such as deposits, and not others, such as loans.349 The fact that law 
generally covers deposits is a reflection of the consumer protection goals of 
governments, and indeed, banking regulations are present in all countries in 
some form or another. These laws generally attempt to ensure the financial 
stability of deposit taking institutions. The provision of small loans and the 
safeguarding of small deposits are two key services which distinguish 
microfinance from regular banking and thus cannot, or at least should not, 
be considered in the same way. 
The analysis of the development of microfinance law from a market 
failure perspective is that microfinance has in many ways evolved to 
changing market conditions, and evolved in a way which bypassed 
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traditional banking regulations. The village based savings and credit groups 
were organised informally all over the world until the introduction of 
microfinance as we know it.350 Thus, microfinance was not established by 
law and did not rely on law to create the industry. However, MFI regulation 
has the potential to increase the size of the industry, rural outreach, 
operating efficiency, and access to external funding.351 
B. How Does Microfinance Regulation Promote Microfinance? 
MFI regulation in theory seeks to support the socioeconomic 
objectives for which microfinance has been designed to achieve. The 
formal financial sector finds poor people theoretically unprofitable because 
of the reasons discussed in the first and second Parts. Further, MFIs are able 
to operate from a smaller cost base and the development of the sector has 
been a result of internal growth, which did not require the stimulation from 
regulation.352 Authors have stated that, in a general sense, the regulation of 
MFIs strengthens their financial stability and sustainability, which allows 
for more capital to be able to be provided to small and medium sized 
enterprises.353 Thus, the research tends to indicate that formal MFI 
regulation does help to achieve the political goal of credit availability. 
Specific MFI regulation seeks to protect the financial system, protect 
depositors and to allow MFI financial sustainability which will in turn 
allow for credit availability to SME’s and low income people.354 In the case 
of Tanzania, Satta found that the regulatory guidelines in 2004 over banks 
restricted them from providing microfinance services because of limits on 
unsecured lending and investment in fixed assets. This author found that no 
Tanzanian MFIs had moved to being regulated because of the restrictive 
legislation framework. These results indicate that it is not only that 
regulation itself may have an effect, but that specific provisions within the 
regulation are also critical for increasing financial inclusion for the poor. 
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The findings by Satta suggested that non-deposit taking MFIs should 
have non-prudential regulation only.355 Non-prudential regulation covers 
such requirements as publishing annual reports, risk management strategies, 
and the board taking ultimate responsibility and accountability. However, 
as indicated by the research of MIX, the ability to take deposits may be 
critical for MFI sustainability, a result which could ensure the long-term 
increase in credit availability to the poor without reliance on NGO and 
subsidised funding.356 
Regulation has the potential to promote microfinance by allowing 
access to funding either from microsavings or from international capital 
markets. These avenues of capital contribute to microfinance sustainability 
by reducing the reliability on donor funds. Greater financial sustainability, 
in theory, may increase credit access to the microfinance target market, who 
are costly to service because of the demographic reasons discussed in the 
second Part of this article. 
C. How are MFIs Shaped by Microfinance Law? 
The main challenge of policy makers has been to develop a regulatory 
structure which allows MFIs to provide reliable sources of finance for the 
growth of small firms and smoothing of consumption expenses.357 The main 
effect of microfinance law on the functioning of MFIs is that it can 
potentially address the main problem which MFIs face: the reliance on 
donor capital.358 As covered in the previous Part of this article, 
microfinance generally achieves the social goals politically defined within 
developing countries. 
In the case of Tanzania it can be seen that the provision of 
microfinance to poor people is hampered by regulation which does not 
allow regular banks to provide microfinance.359 In Tanzania the regulation 
is so restrictive of microfinance provision that for regulated banks to offer 
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microfinance they must create a separate entity which is unregulated.360 The 
regulation in Tanzania does this with the motivation of protecting the 
financial system, however the results of this are restrictions on loans, which 
are unsecured and loans which are not specifically for fixed assets, which 
characterise microfinance loans.361 Authors have indicated that lower MFI 
competition and innovation can result in higher interest rates charged to 
borrowers.362 It can be argued that limiting the provision of microfinance by 
the traditional financial system can affect MFIs in a wide variety of 
quantitative and qualitative ways, with mostly negative consequences for 
the poor. 
Government initiatives to promote microfinance can potentially take 
the form of specific regulations or legal institutional policies, or a broad 
blanket approach to strengthening the legal framework in general. The 
suggestions from the literature on how governments can promote 
microfinance generally fall into these two categories. Works by the IMF 
have highlighted the adverse consequences of regulation, not only in terms 
of its costliness, but also in terms of potential regulatory failure.363 Various 
authors have concluded empirical studies by suggesting that rather than 
governments focusing on individual pieces of legislation, that rather the 
legal framework as a whole is strengthened.364 It has been stated that the 
strengthening of the legal framework entails generalising credit bureaus, 
increasing corporate governance, and financial reporting.365 However, broad 
recommendations such as these provide governments of developing 
countries with little direct instruction. Further, recommendations to 
strengthen legal frameworks and infrastructure may in themselves initiate a 
regulatory advice failure in that the task becomes so hard rather than 
implementing one particular regulation that governments choose to do 
nothing instead. There are clearly combinations of approaches required to 
promote microfinance in developing countries. The interrelationship 
between microfinance and general economic and social conditions is one 
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which cannot be unravelled and as such potential initiatives need to 
consider both broad-based recommendations at a government level as well 
as particular regulations which can be implemented. 
D. Legislation 
Legislators have the power to control social outcomes, both for the 
good and for the bad. The legislator has control over implementing specific 
interventions in order to support the achievement of the socioeconomic 
goals which microfinance is designed to achieve. However, despite socially 
motivated intentions, interventions may have adverse effects. This section 
discusses actions by the legislator which are designed to support social and 
economic political goals, and the theoretical and practical consequences of 
these interventions. In particular, interest rate ceilings, loan portfolio 
proportions, and state guarantees are presented as potential direct regulation 
initiatives. 
1. Interest Rate Ceilings 
The charging of interest on loans is an ethical issue whose continued 
debate can be traced to biblical and Qur’an eras of literature.366 Apparently, 
the charging of interest, or making money from money, is forbidden by 
certain religious texts because it exploits those who are in need of finance 
by those who have available capital.367 Many of these texts state that the 
rich should lend to those who need capital with no interest costs.368 Modern 
financial planning and wealth creation strategies are based on a foundation 
of making money from money, showing the development of these rules in 
modern society. Although the majority of the law and economics literature 
is theoretically against interest rate ceilings, or “usury,” governmental 
restrictions on the charging of interest have been present across modern 
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civilisations for most of recorded history,369 and continue today in selected 
pockets of the world.370 
Authors have found that even in theory the positive benefit of interest 
rate ceilings is balanced by the disadvantages to mean that there may even 
be overall negative effects. In particular, usury laws may reduce credit 
availability for the poor while benefiting the rich through lower interest 
rates on loans and less competition from new businesses entering their 
market.371 These authors have found that each one percentage reduction in 
interest rate limits can lead to 4–6% less economic growth in the decade 
following.372 Thus, interest rate ceilings not only inhibit economic growth, 
but on the other hand, may also protect the poor from unnecessary financial 
exploitation. Interest rate ceilings, thus, may have good motivations, but the 
practical effect may be the opposite of those intended, in that in the long 
term the poor are not protected from exploitation from interest rate caps. 
When considering the effect of interest rate caps, it may also be 
relevant to consider the reason for high interest rates in the first place. 
There is not a clear theoretical understanding of why high interest rates on 
microfinance loans are so pervasive, yet differ widely between countries. 
On the one hand, uncollateralised loans to the marginalised in society 
considerably require compensation for the higher level of risk and costs in 
providing the loan. However, on the other hand, microfinance has been 
designed in a way so that for both individual and group contracts, reliable 
borrowers are selected by the community and have social pressure to repay 
the loan on time. This design, in theory, eliminates the risk and costs, 
because they are outsourced to the community. Yet, high interest rates 
prevail.373 There are two prominent possibilities for the high interest rates: a 
lack of competition which is a market failure given the unregulated nature 
of most MFIs,374 or MFI inefficiency. Theoretically, regulation and 
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institutions can address these underlying causes more effectively than can 
interest rate caps.375 
A key disadvantage of usury laws is that financial innovation, as seen 
in Islamic microfinance to avoid riba, is easily able to overcome the issue 
of interest rates and instead use profit sharing, investment, or fee models 
which result in a similar benefit to the bank.376 Thus, in order to overcome 
this type of circumventing of specific laws, the supervisory body would 
need to document and monitor microfinance products to ensure these 
particular methods have not been employed. In developing countries with 
weak institutions, corruption, and scantly resourced supervisory bodies, this 
method is arguably fraught with risk. 
Theoretically speaking, interest rate ceilings are designed to protect the 
poor from profiteering of loan sharks, payday lenders, and unscrupulous 
microfinance providers who seek to profit over and above the cost of 
providing the loans. This is understandable in environments where 
microfinance borrowers pay above 30% interest while regular borrowers 
pay below 10%.377 However, authors have found that governments wishing 
to reduce the interest rates payable on microfinance loans are better 
occupied with creating economic environments where MFIs can innovate 
and operate efficiently, such as by investing in telecommunications, roads, 
and education.378 Further, authors have suggested that rather than legislating 
interest rate ceilings and repayment schedules it is more prudent to do 
things to reduce the risk of over-borrowing such as a credit database and 
personal bankruptcy laws which complement credit disclosure.379 In 
practice capping interest rates can result in less credit availability, a clear 
failure of the legislation. 
Particular aspects of microfinance are especially relevant for law and 
economics discussions on the topic. One particular aspect of relevance is 
the determination and charging of interest on microfinance loans. In an IMF 
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working paper, Di Bella examined the effect of the GFC on microfinance 
with a particular focus on the impact on interest rates.380 
The results of the study by Di Bella, which are of most interest to this 
Part, are related to interest rate determinants.381 This issue gained 
prominence in the GFC, along with the profits of MFIs, which were 
supposed to exist to serve the poor. The author of this paper goes into detail 
justifying the various reasons for the interest rates charged by MFIs being 
above those charged by commercial banks. This paper states that 
inappropriate regulatory caps on interest rates likely result in the 
withdrawal of MFI funding, reduced MFI scale, increased loan sizes, and 
increases in effective interest rates for the poor as there will be a shift 
towards TMLs, who charge higher interest rates than MFIs. This paper goes 
on to suggest that the most efficient methods to reduce interest rates 
charged on microfinance loans are: increasing infrastructure, innovating 
MFI practices, strengthening the legal framework, and increasing 
competition between MFIs. 
2. Minimum Percentage of Loans to Microfinance Clients 
In developing countries, there are already established financial 
institutions providing targeted financial products to the middle and upper 
classes. Rather than restricting the behaviour of MFIs, regulators have the 
potential to force existing banks to provide microfinance, whether it is 
directly or through subsidiaries. Theoretically, legislation is able to 
guarantee and require a certain percentage of retail capital, e.g. 20%, is 
allocated to microfinance borrowers, ensuring the mobilisation of bank 
assets to increase credit availability to the poor. 
                                                                                                                           
 
380 Di Bella, supra note 50. Di Bella empirically examined the determinants of lending rates using 
data from the Microfinance Information Exchange from 1995–2009 provided by 1774 MFIs in 107 
countries. Of the available data, the study of interest sampled 353 MFIs who had available data for 
seven consecutive years from 1998–2009 and three years of data from 2007–2009 and other selection 
criteria to minimise survivorship bias. Di Bella grouped the MFIs based on region, institution type, legal 
status, purpose, and age. This paper examined variables of MFI performance, global and domestic 
market risk, and lending rate determination. Standard robustness checks seem to have been performed 
on the analyses to ensure validity of the results. 
381 Id. at 24. 
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In theory, this idea harnesses the existing success of financial 
institutions and their established channels of distribution and funding to 
increase the scope of credit access. Banks are already regulated and have 
established access to international credit markets and overnight lending 
agreements with other domestic banks, and this leads to operating 
efficiencies. However, forcing banks to provide products which previously 
brought no profit to them may lead to operations which satisfy the 
minimum requirements of the regulation and nothing more. This direct 
regulation strategy relies heavily on the definition of microfinance. For 
example, if microfinance is simply loans below $1,000, it can be imagined 
that banks provide a set percentage of loans very close to that figure, rather 
than seek “real” microfinance clients, being those just above the poverty 
line. 
There are problems with the incentives to banks and to borrowers to 
engage in microfinance.382 In order to overcome these incentive problems, 
direct regulation provides a possible solution. These legislation options 
accompany and facilitate market functioning. However, as discussed, there 
are potential disadvantages of direct regulation, which means that it is 
realistically a last resort if CSR and facilitative regulation have not, over 
time, achieved the political goals which microfinance can meet. Direct 
microfinance regulation can potentially address the market issues of credit 
access not being available to the poor. However, while an increase in credit 
access may be achievable through a minimum percentage of capital 
allocated to microfinance and interest rate ceilings, it is not without 
potential adverse consequences that these initiatives are employed. 
3. Tiered Regulatory Structure 
The consideration for how MFIs should be regulated rests on a 
framework of understanding the different risks faced and posed by MFIs 
with different operating functions. It is intuitive that MFIs which do not 
receive deposits pose a much lower risk to the financial stability and well-
being of the poor than MFIs which also receive deposits. This is because a 
loan provider which collapses does not necessarily take the life savings of 
                                                                                                                           
 
382 Besley & Coate, supra note 110, at 2. 
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the poor with it, whereas a deposit taker may. In developing a series of 
recommendations for MFI regulation in Tanzania, Satta considered non-
deposit taking MFIs and recommended that they employ internal rules for 
board governance and auditing, rather than imposing stringent requirements 
to ensure financial stability as the law would a deposit-taking MFI.383 
This concept of treating different MFIs differently is key to the 
analysis of the sector from a law and economics perspective. The 
development of MFIs to complete the financial markets clearly illustrates 
the way MFIs differ from traditional banks. MFIs developed the way they 
did because banks were not able to provide access to credit for the poor. 
Thus, MFIs have different operations and purposes than banks, and should 
be treated differently. Further, MFIs differ between themselves and the 
regulation of all MFIs should not take the same form. The regulation of 
non-deposit taking MFIs should therefore reflect the operations and 
potential risks to society. 
In the event that CSR and facilitative regulation are not enough to 
promote microfinance, direct regulation initiatives may be implemented. By 
legislating for the promotion of microfinance the positive intentions of the 
legislator may not be enough to ensure effectiveness. In the case of interest 
rate ceilings, it may be that the result is actually less microfinance outreach 
to target customers and more microfinance provided to the more profitable 
middle classes. However, there is the potential for direct regulation to 
positively affect microfinance in theory. For example, legislating for all 
loan providing institutions to provide a minimum amount of microfinance 
loans may stimulate innovation in the microfinance sector and encourage 
efficiencies of scale by building on already existing expertise in the 
traditional financial market. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The current article has analysed the literature and legal institutions in 
order to attribute the development of microfinance to the legal framework, 
bureaucracy, and social support. It has been found that whether the 
legislation can support the goals that microfinance aims to achieve depends 
                                                                                                                           
 
383 Satta, supra note 42, at 72. 
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on the situations in the country, the benchmarks by which success is 
measured, and a variety of other market and cultural influencing factors. 
Microfinance is an avenue for capital which may support the 
socioeconomic outcomes of the poor. Given that legislators support 
microfinance in their particular jurisdictions, they are then able to formulate 
regulatory responses to facilitate microfinance. At the theoretical extreme, 
governments may provide the capital themselves directly to the poor 
through state run programs. This is in many ways, what is happening in 
India, with state-run MFIs and interest rate ceilings in some regions. At the 
other extreme, governments may simply legislate in a way which facilitates 
microfinance through not restricting their operation and allowing market 
forces and NGO interventions to promote microfinance. A middle ground 
in this theoretical discussion may be that the government provides 
guarantees for the microfinance loans and savings accounts for the poor. 
However, the middle ground option does not account for the high 
transaction costs associated with providing and monitoring each loan by 
MFIs, and this may mean that the scheme does not have the desired effects. 
The trade-off between sustainability and providing credit access is that 
the target market of microfinance brings very high transaction costs because 
of the likelihood of borrowers being illiterate, in extreme poverty, and 
geographically dispersed. Thus, although MFIs may be sustainable by 
serving the poor and middle classes, it is the chronic and rural poor who are 
the theoretical target market and require the most access to credit.384 Hence, 
it needs to be considered how important the sustainability of MFIs are 
considering that increased financial sustainability may be associated with 
lower outreach to the target market of microfinance. 
Part V of this article presented potential soft law and CSR outcomes to 
the development of microfinance. It was found that if the right conditions 
are met, CSR supports microfinance in achieving socioeconomic goals, 
however it will not be sufficient. Thus, this section determined that 
facilitative legislation may be the appropriate default option for 
microfinance regulation. In conjunction with CSR, facilitative regulation 
may complement to provide incentives to banks and borrowers which 
increase the use of microfinance. 
                                                                                                                           
 
384 Di Bella, supra note 50, at 25. 
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Part VI of this article presented the direct regulation methods by which 
microfinance can be supported. The avenues for direct regulation indicated 
that restricting normal market functioning with regulation, regardless of the 
good intentions, may have the reverse effects unless designed with care. It 
was discussed in a theoretical manner that legislated interest rate ceilings 
may have results which restrict the amount of credit available to the poor, 
an outcome which is the opposite of the goals of the legislation. However, 
some regulation such as a set amount of loans from each bank going 
towards microfinance loans, or the government guarantee of microfinance 
loans may actually support innovation by banks and distribution of credit 
availability to the poor. 
The first step of government intervention via regulation into the 
microfinance market is CSR. If the conditions required for CSR to be 
sufficient in supporting microfinance are absent, facilitative legislation is 
the next step of the regulator. Subsequently, if the conditions required for 
facilitative legislation are not sufficient to promote microfinance to a level 
to achieve socioeconomic goals then direct legislation may be required to 
achieve the outcomes which microfinance is designed to support. This 
procedure of regulatory design can be seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The Types of Intervention to Support Microfinance. 
 
The law and economics of microfinance has indicated that there are 
many theoretical issues which mean that the measurement of the direct 
success or failure of microfinance is difficult. The current article provides a 
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theoretical foundation from which to analyse microfinance from a law and 
economics perspective. 
This article has identified how the law can affect the average loan 
balance through an explicit cap on loan balance for microfinance loans, and 
this can have potential flow through effects to the profit margin, outreach to 
the poorest women, total outstanding loans, and subsequently on MFI size. 
Further, laws about how MFIs are able to collect loan repayments such as 
whether they are able to visit private residences, have the potential to 
influence portfolio at risk.385 
This paper has identified the theoretical aspects of microfinance from a 
law and economics perspective. This means that the development of the 
financial market in which microfinance sits has been described with 
reference to how microfinance completes the market. From a theoretical 
perspective, economic development and increases to empowerment may be 
achieved as a result of access to credit and financial services, which in turn 
may be supported by microfinance. The sustainability of MFIs may 
promote microfinance through unrestricted outreach. Microfinance 
sustainability is directly affected by different forms of regulation. This 
paper has discussed some regulatory opportunities and the possible effects 
on the promotion of microfinance. 
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List of Acronyms 
 
Acronym Meaning 
MFI Microfinance Institution 
TML Traditional Money Lender 
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
LVR Loan to Valuation Ratio 
SMM Secondary Mortgage Market 
LMI Lenders Mortgage Insurance 
PDS Product Disclosure Statement 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
NGO Non-Government Organisation 
GFC Global Financial Crisis 
SHG Self Help Group—savings and loan group 
OSS Operating Self Sufficiency—as defined by MIX market exchange 
SME Small and Medium sized Enterprise 
RCT Randomised Control Trials 
CCT Conditional Cash Transfer 
TFP Total Factor Productivity 
PE Partial Equilibrium 
GE General Equilibrium 
ROE Return on Equity 
PAR Portfolio At Risk in the last 30 days 
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis 
MIX Microfinance Information Exchange 
 
